A Mix of Hope and Hokum

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The Soviets climbed on an old and familiar hobbyhorse by insisting that American intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) capable of hitting the Soviet Union be counted--and accordingly limited--as "strategic" weapons. All American Pershing II missiles in West Germany and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe, plus many carrier-based and land-based tactical aircraft in Europe and Asia, would be counted as strategic. Soviet medium-range bombers, on the other hand, would not be counted, nor would the Kremlin's intermediate-range missiles, most notably the triple-warhead SS-20, even though they could wipe out Western Europe. By adding up virtually all "forward-based" U.S. nuclear weapons while at the same time refusing to count Soviet weapons capable of hitting Europe or Asia, the Soviets would be stacking the deck against the U.S. before cutting it (see chart).

The Soviets also continued their old practice of counting warheads delivered from bombers in the same manner as those launched on missiles. The U.S. has argued that bomber weapons (gravity bombs, air-launched cruise missiles and short-range attack missiles) should be treated more leniently, since bombers take longer to reach their targets and are vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft defenses. The U.S. argues that the bombers are thus not first- strike weapons.

Fearful of U.S. high tech, the Soviets would ban all long-range cruise missiles. This would force the Pentagon to cancel its program to outfit B-52s with such weapons, stop the U.S. from deploying long-range ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, and bar development of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. Such a prohibition would rescind a concession that the Soviets had made at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in 1983.

Under the Soviet proposal, the development of any new strategic weapon would be banned or severely restricted. The worst-case interpretation of the provision would forbid the two new American land-based ICBMs--the MX and Midgetman--as well as a new Trident II submarine-launched missile that has a hard-target kill capacity. Yet it would somehow permit inclusion of the two new Soviet ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, which are roughly the equivalent of the MX and Midgetman.

Gorbachev's importunings to the Europeans in Paris further muddy the picture. Rather than offer to trade Soviet missiles aimed at Europe for U.S. "Euromissiles" aimed at the Soviet Union, Gorbachev last week offered to negotiate separately with Britain and France. He suggested that the Kremlin might slash the number of weapons targeted at Europe in return for cuts in the British and French nuclear arsenals, which have not been counted in talks between the superpowers. As a sweetener, Gorbachev made a tantalizing but rather fuzzy and perhaps deceptive offer to reduce the number of SS-20s in range of Europe to 243, the same number the Soviets deployed before NATO began installing U.S. missiles at the end of 1983. (NATO claims the current total of Soviet SS-20s is 441.) The concession was aimed particularly at the Dutch, who had announced that they would install 48 U.S. cruise missiles only if the Soviets had more than 378 missiles aimed at Europe as of Nov. 1.