That Shy Fellow on the Firing Line

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After 6 1/2 years in Washington, the Reagan Administration is still scandalously divided on whether it really wants a new strategic-arms-cont rol agreement with the Soviet Union and, if it does, just what kind. Increasingly beset by congressional critics, the Administration last week was still struggling to define its policy toward South Africa's repressive white government. Ronald Reagan floats blithely above the bureaucratic battles, apparently unwilling to knock heads, bruise egos and decide the urgent issues. Many officials in the capital deplore the drifting and look for someone to blame. Rather than take on the popular President, some are taking their frustrations out on the man who, on critical security matters, is assumed to have the President's ear: John Poindexter.

Poindexter? Almost unknown outside the Washington Beltway, he is a shy, pipe- smoking introvert who became Reagan's National Security Adviser last December and has tried to remain out of public view ever since. Mostly, he has succeeded. A Navy vice admiral still on active duty, Poindexter, 49, sees his role in a limited way: as a staff officer, skillfully condensing the arguments of the quarreling Cabinet secretaries and their underlings, then presenting the various action options to the President. Unlike Henry Kissinger under Nixon and Ford and, to a slightly lesser degree, Zbigniew Brzezinski under Carter, Poindexter does not consider himself a virtual foreign-policy czar. He has neither the desire nor the personality to pressure other high officials into agreement. Instead, by avoiding the limelight, Poindexter believes he can effectively work out compromises among his large-ego clients.

For all his apparent detachment, Reagan apparently favors a low-profile National Security Adviser. None of his previous appointees (Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane) was a forceful head basher, eager to humble a department chief, as Kissinger did with Secretary of State William Rogers. Unfortunately for Poindexter, however, the NSC post is still widely considered a power center with such multiple responsibilities as massaging, if not coercing the departments, dealing with key legislators on critical issues and helping to sell and explain White House policy through press contacts. Not surprisingly, the reluctant Poindexter has been criticized for failing to perform these tasks effectively.

Poindexter botched the handling of an admittedly difficult White House switch on SALT II in May: Reagan's tentative decision to abandon the unratified treaty's limits on various strategic weapons. The NSC chief allowed news of the change to leak from a critical forum: a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. He refused to brief the press on the matter, leaving a less expert White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, to fumble with explanations. Poindexter was also blamed for failing to get the nuances across to the President, who gave highly confusing answers to questions at a press conference.

A White House staffer complains that "Poindexter refuses to concede that explanation and promotion of policy is part of his job. At times, it hurts us." Poindexter, frankly admitting his weakness as a public spokesman, has told his aides, "I'm worried about that, but considering the things I do best, it doesn't make sense for me to change." He added, "I'm here to serve the President."