Falling Short

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While suggesting that he was seeking a middle course on South Africa, Reagan cast the problem in terms of polar alternatives. "We must stay and work," he said, "not cut and run." If Congress imposes sanctions, Reagan said, "it would destroy America's flexibility, discard our diplomatic leverage and deepen the crisis."

The speech did make certain demands on the South African government: the President called for Pretoria to announce a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws; to release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela; to lift the ban on "black political movements," presumably including the African National Congress. He asked that the white government begin a dialogue with its opponents to create a system "that rests on the consent of the governed." None of these, however, was a departure from previous Administration policy.

If the speech seemed to lack a raison d'etre, there was a reason for it. The President's address was in part designed to showcase a symbolic centerpiece: the announcement that the U.S. was sending a black Ambassador to South Africa. The name of the nominee had already seeped out: Robert Brown, a North Carolina businessman and former Nixon staffer. But in further checking, the Administration became concerned about Brown's business association in the past with Alhaji Umaru Dikko, an exiled Nigerian leader who has been charged with embezzling millions of dollars. Brown was hastily persuaded by the White House to withdraw his name.

Missing from the speech was any sense that the Administration's touted reassessment of its South African policy had produced much of anything. That process began at a National Security Council meeting in June, after South Africa declared its current state of emergency, cracking down on dissent and the press. The President vented his frustration with the Administration's inability to articulate its South African policy. "I know what we're against," he said. "Can we state exactly what we're for down there?" But from the outset, there was the unshakable conviction that sanctions would only hurt those they were designed to help, which is why the search for symbolic measures came down to finding a black Ambassador.

After a ten-page draft of the speech written by Communications Director Pat Buchanan was circulated a week ago, State Department bureaucrats argued that it should be canceled. So did White House political operatives, and Chief of Staff Donald Regan eventually agreed. National Security Adviser John Poindexter, on the other hand, contended that even without concrete measures, the speech would put more pressure on Pretoria. A tentative decision had been made to scuttle the speech before Shultz arrived for a meeting with the President. The Secretary took Poindexter's side; he wanted a clear statement of support for the policies he was due to defend on Capitol Hill the following day. Also, the Administration did not want the U.S. to get ahead of its Western allies on the sanctions issue, and Reagan in particular wanted to show his solidarity with his friend British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Western leader most outspoken against sanctions.