South Africa Laying Down the Law

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Others were far more dubious. Said Kansas Republican Robert Dole, who led the defense of the Administration position in the Senate: "This is a feel- good vote." In a message released by the White House shortly after the vote, Reagan expressed his "deep regret" at the Senate vote. The President added, "Our Administration will, nevertheless, implement the law."

It was a bitter defeat. The White House had mounted a determined, if muddled, last-minute campaign to head off the override. Three days after he vetoed the sanctions bill, which had been passed in August by the Senate (84 to 14) and then later by the House of Representatives (308 to 77), the President sent a letter to House Speaker Tip O'Neill offering to impose some measures in an Executive Order. The proposal included bans on the import of iron and steel but omitted coal and other important items, like the cancellation of airport landing rights. Congress was in no mood to settle for half a loaf. Reagan's offer, said a Lugar aide, was "a day late and a dollar short."

White House strategists then switched to a familiar ploy. Meeting with eight Republican Senators who were considered swing votes, Secretary of State George Shultz argued strongly that a congressional override of the sanctions veto would undercut Reagan's credibility at this weekend's meeting with Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland. "To the best of my knowledge, South Africa has never been on the agenda for a summit," commented Lugar. "I think this will be seen as farfetched."

But the blow that finally doomed Administration lobbying efforts came from South Africa. In telephone conversations with two farm-state G.O.P. Senators, Iowa's Charles Grassley and Nebraska's Edward Zorinsky, Pik Botha warned that imposition of sanctions would result in retaliatory measures from Pretoria. South Africa would not only refuse to import any more American wheat (it bought 256,000 tons in the year ending last June) but also block grain deliveries to neighboring black states that depend on South Africa for commercial transport. Both Senators had been buttonholed near the Senate cloakroom by North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms, a friend of Botha's and a ) leading foe of sanctions, who proceeded to put them in touch with the Foreign Minister on a cloakroom telephone.

The gambit backfired badly. A furious Lugar denounced Botha's warning as "despicable" and bordering on "bribery and intimidation." Somewhat startled, Botha shot back that it was the first time he had heard that "one was not supposed to provide information to an American Senator." His riposte seemed relatively mild, considering that the bill under review was designed specifically and solely to influence South African policy. Still, Botha apparently failed to appreciate the Senate's carefully nurtured view of its proceedings as "deliberative" and free from apparent coercion.