Exploring the High-Tech Frontier

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Missile defenses could also be foiled. Boost times could be shortened, perhaps to as little as 50 sec., by equipping attack missiles with more powerful rocket thrusters and toughening their skins so that they could withstand a faster trip through the atmosphere. Missiles could also be made to spin like rifle bullets, so that laser or particle beams could not dwell on one spot, and be given reflective coatings to deflect or diffuse the beams. To be sure, the Soviets would pay a price: such measures would reduce the numbers of warheads and decoys that a missile could carry, and that would make post- boost or mid-course interception somewhat easier for the U.S. But there are clever ways to get around that too. Smart rocks, for example, might be fooled by equally smart decoys that sent out signals like those of warheads.

Finally, the Soviets could attack a Star Wars system directly. Orbiting satellites are vastly easier than missiles or warheads to track and draw a bead on. Just two possibilities: the Soviets could orbit a "space mine" that would blow up near an American satellite and destroy it, or a countersatellite that would discharge a cloud of pellets, capable at orbital speeds of piercing steel, or even beach sand, which could pit and disable laser mirrors. American satellites might be defended against such attacks. But once that kind of cycle begins, says William Shuler, coordinator of S.D.I. research at Livermore, "we are going to be in the counter-countermea sure game forever."

The final decision to build or not to build a Star Wars system cannot be guided by technological prospects alone. The overriding issue is whether a functioning missile defense would enhance or upset nuclear stability. But the research program at least ought to determine what is and is not feasible. Three possible conclusions can be foreseen.

One is that the U.S. could indeed develop a system that would be highly effective against both missile attack and countermeasures at something resembling a reasonable cost. That seems the least likely outcome. No one should say flatly that it is impossible, however. Anyone who does is speedily reminded by S.D.I. advocates that eminent scientists once doubted the feasibility of building nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles and of undertaking flights to the moon.

Research must continue, but it should be conducted by open minds willing to accept a second possible outcome: a conclusion that Star Wars just will not work, and that the large sums likely to be spent on it in the next five years or so might have to be written off. S.D.I. must not become one of these projects to which Government leaders develop such a strategic, political and emotional commitment that they keep pouring money into it regardless of what the research shows. That mind-set could be disastrous. It might, for example, lead to premature tests that could provoke the already worried Soviets into an accelerated buildup of offensive and defensive arms--even if the tests failed.