Putting It on the Table

When Max Kampelman of the U.S. and Victor Karpov of the Soviet Union take their seats at a table in Geneva next week, they will be marking the end of a superpower standoff that has lasted for 15 uneasy months. The possessors of the world's two mightiest arsenals of doomsday weapons will once again be formally seeking agreement on ways to control their destructive power. No miracles are expected: nuclear negotiations over the past 22 years have occasionally resulted in limits on future stockpiles, but never in deep reductions of current ones. Yet the U.S. is convinced that the new round of talks is not just necessary but urgent. Said Secretary of State George Shultz last week: "This may be the last time to really address some of these issues with any prospect of success."

Though there is no shortage of unresolved business from prior attempts at arms control, the Geneva negotiations seem certain to be dominated by a major new issue, one that could profoundly alter the nature of the arms race. That issue is Star Wars, Ronald Reagan's cherished plan to render offensive nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete" by constructing a defensive shield based in outer space. Officially termed the Strategic Defense Initiative, Star Wars would employ a variety of still emerging technologies, including laser beams and high-energy particles, to shoot down attacking warheads before they reach their targets in the U.S.

Ironically, even though the Soviets are as devout in their opposition to Star Wars as Reagan is in his support, it was S.D.I. that evidently prompted Moscow to return to the bargaining table. The Soviets walked away from negotiations in late 1983 to protest U.S. deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles on NATO territory in Western Europe. Moscow vowed that it would not resume the talks until Washington withdrew the offending weapons, even though the Soviets maintain a similar stockpile of their own. Later, increasingly alarmed by the Reagan Administration's deepening commitment to a space-based defense system, the Soviets proposed convening a separate round of talks aimed at controlling these weapons alone. The Soviets are more worried about strategic defenses than about new American offensive weapons like the MX. They already have in their arsenal counterparts to the MX, while an all-out competition in defensive systems would require vast new expenditures and a drastic restructuring of their forces. The U.S. refused to negotiate on space alone. The Administration pointed out that the Soviet buildup in offensive weapons and ground-based defenses has upset the superpower relationship, and therefore those systems must be addressed in new talks.

At a meeting between Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January, the Soviets agreed to a broader agenda. In addition to addressing the Star Wars issue, the new arms negotiations will reopen the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), which centered on Europe-based nuclear missiles. While not ruling out Star Wars as a matter for discussion, Reagan has said publicly that it is not a bargaining chip to be traded away for progress on other issues. That is an understandable stipulation: whether or not Reagan would be willing to negotiate Star Wars, it would make no sense to do so before sitting down at the bargaining table.