Upsetting a Delicate Balance

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In a number of recent public statements, Nitze has stressed that before it is deployed, a strategic defense must be certain to survive attack and be "cost- effective at the margin," that is, be less expensive to build than the offensive systems designed to foil it. It follows from Nitze's cautionary assessment that if Star Wars research fails to produce a scheme that meets those two criteria, the U.S. would be better off trying to make the best of MAD by inducing the Soviets to scale back their offenses and by reaffirming both sides' adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty.

Indeed, if Reagan were to relent in what now seems to be his uncompromising commitment to Star Wars, one conceivable outcome of the forthcoming negotiations might be an updated, modified version of the ABM treaty, combined with a cutback in offensive forces. What the strategic concept sees as the "period of transition" would in fact be the goal of the process. That would be a disappointment to those, like Reagan, who want to see arms control eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, but it would be a relief to others who believe that the best arms control can do is just that--control nuclear weapons, not eradicate them.

Any new agreement that regulated and restricted defenses in a way the Soviets could live with would almost certainly preclude the operational testing as well as the deployment of Star Wars. (Presumably laboratory $ research could continue.) The object of Star Wars, as seen by the Soviets, is to deprive them of any effective offensive force, be it for first strike, second or third. For that reason, they are unlikely to sign any accord that leaves open the possibility of the U.S.'s eventually developing defenses more ambitious and comprehensive than those permitted under an interim agreement of some kind. The Soviets fear American technology as if it were black magic. This fear may have opened a window of negotiability for the forthcoming Geneva talks.

Soviet officials have indicated that they might accept numerical reductions in existing offensive forces on their side for constraints on the "modernization" of American forces. So far, the U.S. is playing very coy about what, if any, new offensive weapons it might be willing to discard in exchange for the right Soviet concessions. That coyness is understandable since the players are just returning to the table.

At the same time, however, the one prospective system that gives the U.S. the most bargaining leverage--Star Wars--may be unavailable for trade-offs, now or ever. Administration officials, including the President, have been vague about whether and under what circumstances S.D.I. would be negotiable. In Geneva, Kampelman and his colleagues will deliver lectures on the virtues of the U.S. strategic concept. Karpov and his comrades will fulminate against the evils of Star Wars. At the same time, they will probe for some sign that space weapons might be negotiable after all.