Air Traffic Control: Be Careful Out There

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The pressure to keep the multimillion-dollar jets and their paying passengers moving is high at most airlines. Contends Galipault: "People in this business are asked or told to do things they know are not only wrong but dangerous. Then they have to ask themselves whether to sell out and save their job or risk it for what they know is right and safe." For too many, the choice appears to be difficult.

The crash at Reno of a Galaxy Airlines Electra that killed 70 people, many of them fans returning to Minneapolis from the 1985 Super Bowl game in San Francisco, turned out to be a horror story of multiple mistakes. NTSB investigators found that on the ground at Reno, the headsets between the ground supervisor and the cockpit did not work, so hand signals were used. After the pilot started two engines, a ground handler discovered that she could not disconnect an air hose used in the starts. The supervisor began frantically signaling the pilots to stop so the hose could be freed. Distracted, the ground crew failed to close a small (8 1/2 in. by 11 in.) access door at the hose connection. The crew neglected to run through the required checklist before takeoff. They heard a thumping noise during takeoff, but despite published warnings about this possibility, they did not realize the door was loose.

Trying to determine if the racket came from an engine problem, the captain reduced power on all four engines, although it would have been safer to check one of them at a time. The loss of speed took the Electra close to its stall point, but the first officer was not monitoring airspeed and altitude as he should have been. The plane stalled and struck the ground. The NTSB criticized the lack of crew coordination and concluded dryly, "The captain attempted both to determine the cause of the vibration and fly the airplane simultaneously, which he was unable to do." In fact, the open door would not have been a hazard if the sound had been properly diagnosed.

What should be done to restore the safety margins? The controller shortage offers only one relatively quick fix: rehire more of the fired PATCO controllers. Many have not found comparable-paying jobs and would be eager to get back at their consoles. But FAA Chief Engen, reflecting the Administration's position, says, "No way." According to the GAO survey, 60% of the current controllers and 85% of their supervisors oppose such a move, though a majority of those at some of the busiest traffic centers say they would have no objection. In fact, about 500 of the less militant PATCO members have been quietly rehired. Many airline pilots would like to see more of the former controllers brought back "with a wink and a nod" to strengthen the system. The pilots argue that the fired PATCO members bear few grudges against the recently hired people. "All this animosity is the rhetoric of 1981 and 1982," argues Jim Holtsclaw, manager of the FAA facility in Los Angeles.

Congress last year approved a request by Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole for funds to add 1,000 new controllers over two years. Dole claims, with little support, that the "system was way overstaffed before the strike" and that new "air-flow" procedures have made it possible for fewer controllers to handle more flights safely.