The Tower Panel: Laying Out the Brutal Facts

It was bound in soothing blue and bore the Presidential Seal. Its language was restrained, dignified, sometimes even gentle. But its message was scalding. Rarely has a presidential commission so sharply criticized its creator. The 288-page report of the President's Special Review Board on the Iran-contra affair describes an incredibly inattentive Ronald Reagan, a hear-no-evil Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a devious former CIA Director William Casey, and a Chief of Staff Don Regan whose proclaimed mastery of spin control failed miserably when faced with a matter of substance. And while these officials floundered, Oliver North, with the approval of his boss on the National Security Council staff, John Poindexter, showed a reckless disdain for the laws of the land by creating a covert network to fund the contras in Nicaragua while trading arms to the Iranians.

Appointed in early December to examine the structure of the NSC, the panel turned into an aggressive inquisition on the Iran-contra affair. Former Texas Senator John Tower, former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former Maine Senator and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie reached their conclusions with resounding unanimity after taking testimony from some 80 witnesses and reviewing thousands of documents, including a treasure trove of NSC computer messages notable for, among other things, their frequent misspellings.

The report assails the NSC staff, headed until December 1985 by Robert McFarlane, and then by Poindexter, for an "obsession" with secrecy that "provided an excuse for abandoning sound process." It notes that the NSC staff, including North, tried to keep much of the Iran initiative secret from foreign policy experts in the U.S. Government even though it was known to a "variety of persons with diverse interests and ambitions -- Israelis, Iranians, various arms dealers and business intermediaries and LtCol North's network of private operatives." Beyond risking exposure abroad, this meant that the "unprofessional" operation was never guided at home by people who understood such essentials as the "situation in Iran; the difficulties of dealing with terrorists; the mechanics of conducting a diplomatic opening." Charged the board: "The operation functioned largely outside the orbit of the U.S. government ((and)) was not subject to critical reviews of any kind."

While the impulsive North freewheeled the Iran venture, he kept only Poindexter "fully informed" and made Casey privy to many operational details. Shortly before McFarlane's now notorious trip to Tehran last May with a plane bearing weapons and the expectation that all American hostages would be released, North uncharacteristically suggested to Poindexter that a "quiet" meeting be held with the President, Shultz, Weinberger and Casey to review the plans. Responded Poindexter in a computer memo to North: "I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz and Weinberger." It was not held.