Weighing a New Mideast Role

• Share

Slowly, warily, all but imperceptibly, the Administration may be inching its way back to a role in Middle East negotiations. Policymakers are far from convinced, however, that the time is quite right. Said a senior official last week: "We are shifting from neutral to first gear, but we're not at cruising speed yet."

The first step toward bringing the U.S. into the arena was taken in February by Jordan's King Hussein, who wooed Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat into an ambiguous agreement to pursue peace with Israel. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is working to thaw the "cold peace" with Israel by exchanging emissaries with Prime Minister Shimon Peres. Mubarak later flew to Washington to make a personal plea to President Reagan for renewed U.S. involvement. Then, last week, the globe-trotting Egyptian leader joined King Hussein on a trip to Baghdad to enlist the support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Not since Reagan took office have Arab leaders displayed such an aggressive effort to revive the dormant peace process and, most important, to get the U.S. back into the diplomatic game.

So far, the Reagan Administration has been standoffish, giving the Arab overtures wary encouragement while avoiding, at least for the time being, any direct involvement. In his press conference last week, the President said that the U.S. "did not want to participate in the negotiations--it wouldn't be any of our business to do so." He added, however, that he had "complimented" Mubarak for his work and that the U.S. would "do whatever we could to help bring the warring parties together."

Reagan has ample reason for caution. The Administration's 1982 Middle East peace plan, which called for Palestinian self-government on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in association with Jordan, was peremptorily rejected by Israel and manhandled by indecisive Arab countries. Washington's well-intentioned attempts to make peace in Lebanon led to the deaths of 267 American servicemen and ended in the mortifying withdrawal of U.S. troops early last year. For the past 13 months, U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East has essentially been on hold. The tragedies in Lebanon had resulted in a vague policy known as disengagement, a virtual do-nothing stance. When the U.S.-mediated accord between Israel and Lebanon crumbled in March 1984, Secretary of State George Shultz remarked bitterly that Middle East governments reluctant to accept American peace overtures "must bear the responsibility to find alternative formulas."

While the newest Arab initiatives imply an awakening sense of responsibility, they leave unresolved a number of critical issues. The Hussein-Arafat agreement suggested that a Jordanian-Palestinian team, selected by the two leaders, be empowered to negotiate with Israel and the U.S. in a U.N. conference. Reagan indicated last week that the U.S. might meet with such a delegation if that would further direct negotiations with Israel. But no meeting could include members of the P.L.O., with which the U.S. and Israel refuse to bargain. Hussein and Arafat also endorsed a confederation of Jordan and a Palestinian state on the West Bank, but they gave little indication of how this new entity would be run. Moreover, their accord does not explicitly accept Israel's right to exist or U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the exchange of Israeli-occupied territory for peace.