Central America The Wright Stuff

One by one, they trooped to the Capitol Building for closed-door sessions with House Speaker Jim Wright. First came Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra, toting a proposal for cease-fire talks between his Sandinista government and the U.S.-backed contras. After Ortega left, Secretary of State George Shultz arrived, followed by the contra leaders. Finally, Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, Nicaragua's ranking churchman, disappeared into Wright's office. An exasperated Reagan Administration, its policymaking efforts sidelined by the frenzy of congressional diplomacy, was forced like the rest of Washington to wait and see what might come of Wright's highly unusual mediation efforts. Complained Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater: "We don't know what he is up to."

The next day, Ortega emerged from a two-hour meeting with Obando, attended by Wright, and announced an eleven-point cease-fire proposal for Nicaragua. His plan calls for a monthlong cease-fire to take effect on Dec. 5. During the cease-fire, armed contras would be confined to one of three zones spread over a 4,200-sq.-mi. area. All military shipments to the rebels would halt during that period, but supplies of clothes, food and other nonlethal aid could be delivered by neutral international agencies. Under the proposal, any contras who lay down their arms will be granted amnesty and "may join in the political life of the nation with full enjoyment of their rights."

Ortega called his scheme a "proposal, not an ultimatum." Wright found the details patchy, but felt that they had "elements of good faith" for both sides. Publicly, the Reagan Administration was unwilling to rush to judgment. "We don't really know what's in this Ortega-Wright plan, and we just have to wait and see what they're talking about," said Fitzwater. Privately, officials denounced the scheme. "It sounds a lot like the Sandinistas' old unilateral cease-fire," said a naysayer at State. Although Contra Leader Adolfo Calero shot down Ortega's call for the rebels to disarm, the contras seemed to withhold judgment.

Ortega's announcement capped a dramatic week of high-stakes diplomacy that included conciliatory gestures, intransigent demands, petty snubs and perhaps the promise of some real movement. But while talks between the Sandinistas and contras looked more promising, the prospects for talks between Managua's comandantes and U.S. officials remained dim, despite expressions of interest on both sides. Once Wright entered the picture, the bizarre possibility emerged that Ortega might try an end run on the White House and secure congressional approval for his plans through Wright.

Certainly Wright was at the center of the action. Last August the Texas Democrat and President Reagan co-sponsored a peace plan for Central America. Two days later in Guatemala City, five of the region's Presidents, including Ortega, signed a different accord, this one championed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez. Wright quickly threw his support behind the homegrown pact and invited Arias to address Congress. Since then Wright has repeatedly warned the Reagan Administration that no new funds for military aid to the contras will be approved so long as the peace process remains alive. At the same time, Wright has turned down two Sandinista invitations to serve as a mediator. "I do not aspire to any role except as a friend," he maintained last week.