Central America The Wright Stuff

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Yet it was hard to regard his mysterious behind-the-scenes maneuverings as anything short of mediation. Wright's attempts to edge the Sandinistas and contras closer to talks made the Reagan Administration uneasy, if not downright furious. "We don't think it's desirable for the U.S. to inject itself directly into these talks," said State Department Spokesman Charles Redman. Fitzwater was blunter. "Anytime you start seeing stories of independent plans," he said, "you have to start being a little nervous." Others in Washington charged that Wright's horse trading usurped Reagan's foreign policy authority. Said Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, a supporter of contra aid: "I think it's at best unseemly and at worst unconstitutional."

The muted furor served Ortega's purposes well. In coming to Washington, his first such visit since 1979, Ortega aimed to promote Nicaragua's peace gestures, pressure Reagan to take steps toward talks and paint the contras as "sons of Reagan." The propaganda strategy was effective. While Ortega actually achieved little beyond handing Obando a cease-fire proposal, which he could have done in Managua, he received considerable attention. The final masterstroke: a tour of the Lincoln and Viet Nam War memorials.

Ortega and Reagan had begun the week on more equal footing. Like two riverboat gamblers, they had each invited the other to a game of poker, then each tried to fix the rules to his own advantage. The first bid came from Reagan. In a speech to members of the Organization of American States, he said that once the Sandinistas have begun "serious negotiations" with the contras, his Administration would "be ready to meet jointly with the foreign ministers of all five Central American nations, including the Sandinistas' representative." The call for "serious" talks was purposefully vague, and one underlying message was plain: no bilateral talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua.

Still, Reagan's speech was a milestone. For the first time since the signing of the Guatemala plan, Reagan had made a concrete gesture to advance the peace process. The next day, the Secretary of State announced before the OAS that the Administration would withhold until next year a request to Congress for $270 million in additional aid to the contras. His too was a mixed message. Shultz pledged to "give peace every chance," then vowed that contra funding would continue until "full democracy is established" in Nicaragua.

Ortega, however, appeared to read encouragement into Washington's more conciliatory approach. In a midair interview en route to the OAS meeting, he told the New York Times that if Reagan invited him to talk, Ortega would be willing to have contra leaders at the meeting. For the first time, a Sandinista official was publicly expressing a willingness to meet contra leaders face to face. The Administration rejected the offer, claiming that such an arrangement would devalue the contras' negotiating position.