The Road to Zero

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In September 1986, the Soviets once again began dangling the bait of an INF- only summit. They were, said Karpov, under instructions to take "practical steps" that would assure progress at a "meeting at the highest level." They were prepared to concentrate on the most promising area, which was INF, and, in Karpov's words, to leave START and SDI "off to one side, in hopes of making as much progress as possible on those at the summit itself." They proposed their own version of an interim solution: 100 INF warheads per side in Europe -- although with no Pershing IIs -- and a freeze on Asian SS-20s.

The Reagan Administration, to the relief of some of its own members as well as numerous Europeans, saw an opportunity to retreat from the controversial zero option and to reinstate the interim solution, with token missile deployments in Europe. U.S. negotiators tabled a response that seemed quite close to the Soviet proposal: each superpower could keep 100 INF warheads in Europe, but with some Pershing IIs permitted.

The next day Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who was in the U.S. for a visit to the U.N., called on President Reagan at the White House and delivered an invitation from Gorbachev to Reagan for a meeting in Reykjavik. An official on the powerful Central Committee Secretariat, Georgi Kornienko, said in Moscow, "We feel it is important to make progress somewhere, and INF appears to be the only area of opportunity." All indications were that the deal the Soviets had in mind was the interim agreement, not the zero option.

But when Reagan arrived in Reykjavik, hoping to put the finishing touches on an INF treaty, he found himself confronted instead with yet another Gorbachev blockbuster. Gone was the offer of an interim INF agreement that would allow the U.S. to maintain some missiles in Europe for a limited period. In its place was the zero option, which would meet the long-standing Soviet objective of keeping all American missiles off the Continent. As before, having originally proposed the zero option, the Administration felt it could not reject it at Reykjavik.

There was an almost audible sigh of relief from NATO capitals when, at the end of the dizzying weekend, the deal fell apart over the old issue of linkage: Gorbachev made an INF deal conditional on a comprehensive strategic agreement that would confine Star Wars to laboratory research. Reagan refused on the grounds that such limitation would "kill" the program.

The Americans had now seen Gorbachev delink and relink INF and SDI so often that they calculated it was only a matter of time before he delinked yet again. Moreover, it was increasingly clear that he was determined to eliminate American missiles in Europe.

As they prepared for the end game of INF, the Soviets upgraded their Geneva team. Karpov was recalled to Moscow and replaced by a Deputy Foreign Minister and former No. 2 Soviet diplomat in Washington, Yuli Vorontsov. Suave, self- assured and experienced in back-channel diplomacy, Vorontsov proposed spending less time in large sessions, which were, he said, "too polemical." Instead, they should concentrate on the individual negotiations, including working lunches for himself and Kampelman.