Books: Why All Empires Come to Dust THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS

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Hence, Kennedy detects a pattern repeated over and over: "Wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth." While worrying about their foes, states playing in the world arena must constantly maintain a delicate internal equilibrium. Armies are required for security, but they cost money. Military superiority by itself is often deceiving, since it may be weakening a state's ability to compete economically and fund future conflicts.

Read this way, European history looks subtly different. Supposedly decisive battles such as the destruction of the Spanish armada in 1588 or Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815 seem instead to be foregone conclusions, the visible death throes of nations that had previously mismanaged or squandered their resources. Kennedy does not subscribe to the "Great Man" theory of history. He acknowledges that his account of the Napoleonic wars tends "to downplay the more personal aspects of this story, such as Napoleon's own increasing lethargy and self-delusion." But the author insists that inspiring < leaders or brilliant generals can at best cause momentary glitches in the relentless "dynamic of world power," which entails constant change both within and between nations. "Those are not developments," Kennedy warns, "which can be controlled by any one state, or individual."

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is sure to generate considerable discussion and debate among professional historians. Amateur spectators will probably concentrate on what the coming decades are supposed to hold. Americans, specifically, have noticed over the past few years that wide swatches of the rest of the world are turning from obedient clients into uppity competitors. Trade imbalance, budget deficits, falling currency, skyrocketing military expenses now conspire to trouble the American dream. There is a nagging fear that things are coming unglued, and Kennedy does little to allay it.

He argues that the combination of the U.S.'s declining rate of industrial growth and its extensive military commitments spells trouble: "Decision- makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously." Even aside from this dilemma, American dominance is on the wane, not because the nation is growing poorer or weaker but because others are becoming richer and stronger. Kennedy expects both China and Japan to improve their shares of world power; if the European Community can submerge national disputes and agree on common goals, then it too will find its wealth and influence increasing. The Soviet Union possesses a vast military machine and a stagnant economy; uh-oh for the U.S.S.R.