The Contra Tangle

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Classical tragedy demands a unity of time, place and action, a drama that unfolds in a day. In Washington last Wednesday, Ronald Reagan's flawed Iran- contra policy came close to just such a singular confluence. Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh announced his long-awaited criminal indictments of two of the President's former National Security Council staff members and their accomplices for diverting Iran arms profits to the Nicaraguan contras. Less than four hours later, the President ordered 3,200 troops into Honduras as a show of resolve against Nicaragua's Sandinistas, who once again had crossed the Honduran border to pin down the hapless contras in their main base.

As if the day needed any further hallmarks, several hundred people gathered at a church service in Georgetown to remember American Hostage Terry Anderson, 40, on the third anniversary of his kidnaping in West Beirut, a poignant reminder of the frustrations that underlay one leg of the Iran-contra affair.

Ten months before Reagan leaves office, the hostages, the contra question and the scandal that entwines them remain the most divisive and disabling issues of his presidency. Nicaragua, an irritant to Reagan since he arrived in Washington, clattered back to center stage. As in a tragedy, the President's past misjudgments were returning to haunt him. No matter how a jury votes on the charges against Oliver North, John Poindexter, Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, the verdict is already in on Reagan's handling of his contra policy.

; The President was determined to forge the contras into a weapon against the Marxist Sandinistas, but his shifting rationales for what he was doing undermined his credibility. When opposition from Congress kept him from supporting the contras openly, he tried to do so covertly. The Iran-contra scandal that ensued aggravated widespread public uneasiness over U.S. policy toward Managua and hastened the end of congressional funding for the rebels.

Now the contras are bereft of American aid, and may be threatened with extinction as a fighting force, eliminating what may be the only U.S. leverage for keeping the Sandinistas honest. Yet the Administration's cries of alarm have been met with widespread skepticism. Once again the President fudged his reasons for dispatching troops, offering the claim that the border battle represented a Sandinista "invasion" of Honduras. Two years ago he made the same assertion when he sent U.S. helicopters to ferry Honduran troops to the border. That crisis too had flared while he was pressing Congress to reconsider support for the contras. "We've heard the Administration cry 'Wolf! Wolf!' before," said Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. "I hope it does not prove to be counterproductive ((and)) does not derail the peace process."

Yet the fighting in Central America was proof that the U.S. cannot simply declare victory for the peace process and get out. The Sandinistas' attempt to knock out the contras' remaining major supply base a week before peace talks were due to resume suggests that Nicaraguan Leader Daniel Ortega is no more interested in compromise than is the President. If Congress refuses to sustain the contras any longer, it must still come to terms with Reagan, or his successor, on a policy to contain the Sandinistas and foster democratic reforms in Nicaragua.