Marathon Man

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Jackson's campaign was his usual kinetic circus, strong on spirit, short on tactical precision. While he avoided a direct duel with either Koch or Gore, he was helpless in preventing media attention on his problems with Jews rather than his current themes. A button seen on many lapels read I'M A TOUGH 'HYMIE' -- JEWS AGAINST JACKSON. The night before the vote, on a rainy street in Harlem, Jackson let some of his bitterness show. The press was ignoring his arguments about public policy. Instead, he complained, the coverage was "all about diversion, all about bright lights and showtime and deflection. It's all about jive."

In the final days, Jackson's local centurions, rather than his national advisers, dominated his scheduling. He found himself returning repeatedly to black and Hispanic districts instead of mining racially diverse neighborhoods, as he had in other states. Jackson complained about his itinerary, but not strongly enough to change it. Conceded one of his aides: "It was a very, very black campaign."

Dukakis, for his part, practiced a speak-no-evil strategy designed to avoid mistakes and emphasize his sober competence. Over and over again he reminded listeners, "I don't want to be a great communicator. I want to be a great builder." Unlike Gore, he courted the large Jewish community without debasing himself. Unlike Jackson, he sounded sympathetic about big-city problems without committing himself to grandiose spending programs or a tax increase. Dukakis' New York manager, Paul Bograd, summarized the tactics simply: "We just bore in, bore in, bore in with the basic Dukakis message." Yet the winner was an oddly passive figure as the campaign pivoted on Jackson, Gore and Koch. By default, he occupied the middle position between Jackson on the left and Gore's vague pretensions about patrolling the party's right flank. The ABC News exit poll indicated that about a third of Dukakis' supporters were voting primarily against a rival rather than for him.

Afterward Dukakis bemoaned the tenor of New York's campaign: "What happened obviously polarized things. I think it's very important that that not happen again." Yet during the brouhaha, Dukakis did not take a stand against Koch's excesses. Nor did he campaign in black precincts, except for one brief symbolic visit. When the votes were counted, Jackson had captured 97% of the black electorate, according to the NBC News survey, and 16% of the white. Dukakis won the primary in the suburbs and upstate areas; ethnically, he mustered a strong combination of Jewish and white Catholic supporters. Most troubling, from Dukakis' viewpoint, was his inability to win among blue-collar and union families, which Jackson carried in New York. "Democrats who sweat for a living" are not yet in a lather over Dukakis. The candidate professes unconcern about these ethnic and class fault lines: "I can't remember a time ^ when the Democratic Party was more together in a fundamental way."

Yet blacks, the most devout faction in the Democratic temple, are virtually unanimous in support of Dukakis' remaining rival. Many white voters still reject the Jackson candidacy. In TIME's poll, only 34% of white voters say they could vote for Jackson in November (vs. 59% who could support Dukakis). Even among white Democrats, just 45% say they could vote for Jackson.