From Hubris to Humiliation

Does anyone deliver bad news with a more mournful mien than Secretary of State George Shultz? Last week, as President Reagan headed off to Moscow, his dispirited Secretary of State announced the collapse of U.S. efforts to force the resignation of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's pugnacious strongman. Shultz had delayed his own departure for the summit, believing that Noriega was about to yield. Instead, at the eleventh hour the general rejected the U.S. terms, which included a controversial offer to drop federal drug- running charges against him. With that, Shultz broke off talks and denounced Noriega as a "burden on the people of Panama." The Reagan Administration, he added for a little positive effect, would continue working with Panamanians and "democratic forces throughout the hemisphere" to get rid of the machete- waving dictator.

Shultz did not say how this could be done. Nor is it likely, on the evidence of the past year, that he knows. Since the U.S. drive to oust Noriega began last summer, Washington has once again demonstrated how the Law of Unintended Consequences can lead to a foreign-policy disaster. Through bureaucratic backbiting, uninformed bluster and gross miscalculation, the Administration did not merely fail to depose Noriega. It also managed to cripple Panama's economy, weaken the local democratic opposition, undermine pro-American attitudes, damage U.S. prestige in Latin America and exacerbate concerns about the stability of the Panama Canal. Moreover, the fiasco could easily become a major liability to George Bush's presidential quest. Says New York's Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato: "What you have here is an Administration that has set its hair on fire and is trying to put it out with a hammer."

Reagan was asked after his arrival in Helsinki if he thought the Panama debacle made the U.S. appear foolish. "I don't feel that way," he said. But almost everyone else does, including many inside the Administration.

Finger pointing and recriminations abound. Were the consequences of bringing an unenforceable indictment against a foreign leader seriously considered? Or the political embarrassment of plea bargaining with a thug? Why did Washington act before properly assessing Noriega's strength with the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) he commands? And why conduct a policy that was at once too public and too timid?

Criticism is aimed primarily at Elliott Abrams, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Despite getting into trouble for misleading Congress about U.S. aid to the contras, Abrams still enjoys Shultz's support. Stubborn and often intolerant of dissent, he fought for what he saw as a worthwhile goal: ousting Noriega. But Pentagon brass, who balked at threatening Noriega with force, say Abrams gave little thought to the other possible effects of his actions. "Nobody disagrees that Noriega must go," says a senior Defense Department official. "We just think State ((meaning Abrams)) is bungling it."