And Now, Divorce?

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The dilemma that Gorbachev confronts is how to devolve power not only from the top downward but also from the center outward to the republics -- without unhinging his entire reform program or, worse still, losing territory. Should Gorbachev accede to Lithuania's demand for secession, he knows, he will be pressed for comparable concessions from Estonia and Latvia. And once the secession fever infects the Baltics, the Kremlin fears, what is to stop it from spreading to the other republics? Last week Gorbachev's Politburo ally, Alexander Yakovlev, dubbed this unnerving prospect "the domino effect."

Gorbachev's chief political rival, Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, had a darker name for it: "the beginning of the end." That gloomy prognosis suggests that Gorbachev will meet with staunch resistance in conservative quarters if he bows to Lithuania. Andrei Makarov, a well-placed Moscow lawyer, says that the conservatives are milking the messy political situation and that Gorbachev was actually backed into going to Lithuania when, on a suggestion from opposition leader Boris Yeltsin, the Central Committee voted for Gorbachev to head the delegation. In Washington, however, a top Kremlinologist cautions that any talk of Gorbachev's political demise is premature. As yet, he observes, no plausible successor has emerged to take his place, and Gorbachev's opposition within the Politburo is fragmented.

Haunted by nightmares of blood in Tiananmen Square, Rumania and even Tbilisi last April, when Soviet troops massacred 19 protesters, Moscow is reluctant to use force to maintain control in the republics. It is also possible to contemplate the three Baltic states seceding without the entire union unraveling. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are relatively recent additions to the union. Furthermore, unlike many of the other republics, the Baltics were independent at the time of their incorporation. There is, therefore, a historical basis for treating them as a special case. Perhaps the Kremlin aims to do just that. Last week Soviet government spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov went so far as to speak of establishing a "mechanism for divorce" to deal with the Lithuanian situation.

In the Baltic republics, secessionist passion is inversely proportional to the percentage of ethnic Russians living there. Lithuania has the smallest Russian population; hence Gorbachev received the region's most emotional dose of separatism. Nonetheless, there was something exhilarating about seeing the leader of the Soviet Union debating citizens in the streets. Thomas Jefferson could not have asked for a better illustration of democracy in action, though Gorbachev may have wished for an experience a shade less vivid.

For now, Gorbachev hopes to appease Lithuanians with pledges to help them achieve independence within a federation, while soothing conservatives with promises that any formula for secession will be worked out in Moscow. There is still room for compromise; while all parties to the conflict bandy words like "self-determination," "federation" and "sovereignty," few have attempted to nail down their precise meanings.

Last week Gorbachev insisted that if the issue is ever put to a vote, Lithuanians will ultimately reject secession in favor of his own federation plan. Although Gorbachev did not back up that prediction with a wager, he has bet his prestige on the outcome.