The Gulf: The Tortoise and the Hare

So far, so good. Since the morning Saddam Hussein sent Iraqi troops storming into Kuwait, the Soviet Union has been cooperating with the West in opposing him. Moscow voted yes four times in the United Nations to condemn Iraq and impose stiff sanctions. Soviet diplomats have repeatedly urged Iraq to retreat and to free all hostages, while rebuffing pleas to ease their support for the international opposition. When the U.N. was debating the crucial fifth vote authorizing force to back up the sanctions, Gorbachev publicly told Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait or face further action from the U.N. Only a few hours later, the Soviets joined the U.S. in approving the historic resolution.

Probably no diplomatic change of heart during the gulf crisis has been as startling as Moscow's decision to join the international community against Iraq, the country that has long been the pivot for Soviet foreign policy in the gulf. But there are limits to Moscow's willingness to follow Washington's lead. Just because the Kremlin shares the American view that Iraq must withdraw its forces unconditionally from Kuwait does not mean the two superpowers see eye to eye on how to achieve that goal. While the Soviets do not intend to break ranks with the West, they have made it clear they want to proceed in their own way and at their own pace in dealing with Baghdad. Wary of a war, the Soviets want to give diplomacy and economic and political pressure time to work before any action is taken.

, Now that the initial emergency has been met, the Kremlin has been assessing its own interests in the complex situation. In effect, the U.S.S.R. wants to keep a foot in both camps, working with the international opposition -- and reaping the political goodwill and potential economic rewards of being a team player -- without cutting all ties to Iraq. Moscow could serve as a potential mediator, and the Soviets do not want to sacrifice all their independent influence in the region -- or see the U.S. become the only outside player -- once the crisis is over. As Vitali Naumkin, deputy director of Moscow's Institute of Oriental Studies, explains, "The Soviet Union has a different role to play. It still has a credit of trust with some regional powers that will not deal with the U.S."

The Kremlin's attempt to preserve its lines of communication with Baghdad has resulted in a diplomatic two-step. Moscow has resisted withdrawing its controversial contingent of military advisers from Iraq -- numbered at anywhere from 500 to 1,000 -- until their contracts expire, but has provided the Pentagon with information on Soviet military hardware there. After the Soviets voted to enforce the sanctions, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that "we have no plans to use force or take part in such operations."

Moscow has pragmatic interests in staying slightly apart from the international pack baying at Saddam's heels. Economic ties with Baghdad have been a lucrative source of hard currency for the cash-strapped Soviet Union, and could continue to be in the future. There is also the unresolved question of the nearly 9,000 Soviet citizens still in Iraq, the largest national group trapped there from the West and East bloc countries.