Cambodia Hurdles to Peace

After a week-long diplomatic gavotte over protocol, representatives of the four factions in Cambodia's civil war were all present in Jakarta last weekend. On hand were Prime Minister Hun Sen and leaders of two of the three guerrilla armies fighting to overthrow him: Son Sann and Khieu Samphan of the infamous Khmer Rouge. The third, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, pleaded a last- minute illness and sent a stand-in.

The gathering was to consider a maddeningly complex peace proposal put forth last month by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that requires approval by all the Cambodian "parties" before it can go into effect. The main item on the Jakarta agenda was the plan's call for creation of a Supreme National Council intended to symbolize Cambodian nationhood during a long transition to peace.

To some, the prospects for ending the war seem brighter than they have in a long time. Not only were the Cambodian parties due to begin talking again in Jakarta, but Secretary of State James Baker disclosed that the U.S. had agreed to engage in direct diplomatic contact with representatives of the Hun Sen government. Still, many observers remain pessimistic. "An international agreement on Cambodia does not equal an internal agreement," said Shafiq Fit Abdullah of the Institute of Strategic International Affairs in Kuala Lumpur. To get that, at least six steps -- each problematic at best -- must be taken before the U.N. plan can succeed:

1. A Supreme National Council must be created. The body would have only an advisory role, but Hun Sen argues, not unreasonably, that the tripartite rebel coalition should have one vote instead of the three it seeks. It is by no means certain that the current peace offensive will pass even this initial hurdle.

2. All parties must accept a so-called interim U.N.-run administration, pending elections for a new government. The rebel factions have indicated their support for this, and small wonder. The proposal would achieve their main goal -- removal of Hun Sen's government -- at least until elections were held, and would replace his regime with an outside government that would be virtually powerless to punish cease-fire violations. Moreover, U.N. bureaucrats could serve as yet another foreign enemy against which the xenophobic Khmer Rouge could rally popular opinion. Hun Sen has predictably refused to dismantle his government, which was installed by the Vietnamese army in 1979 to replace the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

For their part, the Khmer Rouge and the other factions may agree to elections as a tactical matter. But none of them have ever participated in a fair election, and the Khmer Rouge, at least, could never dream of winning one. For them, power can come only from the barrel of a gun.