Ready For Action

On the scorched sands of Saudi Arabia, 180,000 American ground troops wait impatiently, cleaning their weapons, exercising, thinking of D-day. Flashing overhead are the best attack planes of the U.S. Air Force: F-15s, F-16s, radar-evading F-117 Stealth fighters. At sea, U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers train their Tomahawk cruise missiles on Iraqi targets, while aircraft carriers launch and recover squadrons of bombers and interceptors.

Even more muscle is on the way. An additional 100,000 U.S. soldiers have been earmarked for the Persian Gulf. Military commanders in Saudi Arabia say no limit has been placed on the number of troops that might be sent. George Bush says, "We must keep all our options open."

While the U.S., European and Arab forces arrayed in the gulf are not yet strong enough to mount an overpowering offensive against the 430,000 Iraqi troops in and around Kuwait, Bush clearly counts military force as one of those options. He has pledged to liberate Kuwait and restore its government, which means that if necessary Operation Desert Shield can become Desert Sword. The buildup and the war that may ensue have cast the spotlight on two men who may be the most important policymakers in the Bush Administration: Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Already these Pentagon partners have smoothly directed the biggest U.S. military effort since Vietnam.

Whether this crisis leads to war or to a peaceful outcome, it has fortuitously arrived at a time when the Pentagon is headed by two of the most seasoned and able leaders in years. Cheney's experience as a Congressman and White House operative and Powell's as National Security Adviser have made them masters of the political wars in Washington. Each has a unique understanding of what pressures the other is under. The outcome of the gulf confrontation may be determined by the way they carry out their duties.

The pair's organizational and diplomatic skills have been strikingly evident since the earliest moments of Desert Shield, which began only a few hours after Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait on Aug. 2. Early the next morning, Cheney tucked a top-secret briefing file under his arm and walked to the small, heavily guarded Current Situation Room on the second floor of the Pentagon. Powell was waiting there for him. Amid the maze of projection screens, television monitors and colored telephones, they drafted the advice on military responses Cheney would offer Bush: the U.S. could -- and must -- defend Saudi Arabia with a rapid infusion of military might.

Cheney's support for armed intervention was unqualified, though he pointed out to Bush that the U.S. presence in the region at the outset was weak -- only a handful of ships in the gulf. Powell backed Cheney with the proviso that an insertion of American forces should be massive and swift, not gradual.

Many in Washington assumed Powell's insistence on that point was a hangover from the painful escalation of the Vietnam War, where he served two tours, but Powell denies it. "It's not so much my Vietnam experience as 32 years of military education and training," he says. "If you are going to commit the armed forces of the U.S. to a military operation that could involve conflict and loss of life, then do it right."