Last Gasps on the Negotiation Trail

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For the entire 387 minutes that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met in Geneva last week, a brown manila envelope lay unopened on the table, mute testimony to the breach between their positions. The package contained a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein conveying in stark terms Washington's determination to see Iraq leave Kuwait. Baker had given Aziz a photocopy of the letter at the outset of the meeting. As Baker and the 16 other officials present looked on, the Iraqi read the message slowly, his hands trembling. Finally, he said he could not bring such a letter to his leader; it was not cast, he said, in tones appropriate for communication between heads of state.

When the two sides broke for lunch, Baker deliberately left the envelope in the middle of the table, instructing an American security agent to keep an eye on it. As the meeting ended, Baker made a last stab. "Mr. Minister, I want to ask one more time. Are you sure that you do not want to receive this letter?" he said. "Yes," Aziz replied. Baker picked up the envelope and left the room.

The rest of the meeting was no more productive, though the atmosphere was calm and professional. There was no shouting, no pounding on the table. Aziz politely asked if he could light a cigar, and Baker, a former smoker, just as politely said he would relish the aroma. But neither side had anything new to say. Neither of the men budged a jot from their mutually exclusive positions. Baker said Iraq must quit Kuwait without conditions or face war. Aziz insisted the gulf conflict must be solved in conjunction with all Middle East problems.

Though Baker, the diplomat, was clearly depressed by the outcome of the discussions, his boss, the Commander in Chief, was unfazed. As Bush aides explained it, the Baker-Aziz conference confirmed the President's expectations without realizing his worst fears. "Anybody who expected a breakthrough in Geneva was a fool," said a White House official. At the same time, the Administration had worried that the Iraqis would spring a dramatic surprise, offering, perhaps, a partial withdrawal, which would have frayed the coalition against Saddam and made Congress less likely to authorize Bush to use force. That Aziz unpopped no jack-in-the-box was a relief to Washington. It was also a plus that the meeting went on so long. Should war finally come, the Administration can now say it seriously tried another way.

Administration officials pointed out that while Geneva proved a dead end, it was not the only path to peace. No sooner had Baker, briefing reporters, uttered his first "regrettably" than a haggle of diplomats began to accelerate the push for alternative peace initiatives. Among them were efforts by the French, the European Community and the Algerians to act as interlocutors. Most notably, United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar announced he would go to Baghdad to see Saddam. "The window for peace has not widened, but neither has it been slammed shut," said German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Ironically, the stalemate in Geneva may make it easier for Iraq to accept someone else's settlement plan. "Saddam needs to look like he's standing up to the United States," said a White House official. "Slapping us down by refusing to accept the President's letter might help him save enough face to withdraw from Kuwait."