The New France

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That relationship remains as useful and vital as it was 30 years ago. The trouble is, the French today are no longer in league with West Germany. Their chief partner is now a larger, unified country, raising some worst-case nightmares of an old nemesis reborn. The two times in modern history when Germans ventured to consolidate -- under Bismarck and under Hitler -- France was eclipsed and conquered. Apprehensions today do not envisage anything so dire as a panzer plunge through the Ardennes, but many French wince at the prospect of an expanded Federal Republic overmastering them with its money, industry and technology.

Even France's famous "civilizing mission" to the rest of the world has come under question. French policy toward the Arab countries, supposedly an example of Paris' understanding approach to Third World aspirations, sank practically without a trace in the quicksand of the gulf crisis. Says Gilles Martinet, an ex-ambassador with close links to the Socialists: "For most of our statesmen, whether they belonged to the left or the right, France was always strong, feared, respected, admired and envied -- until the gulf war taught us otherwise."

Yet France's seat as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council still gives the country a leverage in world affairs far beyond that of Germany, Japan or Italy. The seat explains why Mitterrand insists that any new security arrangements for the Middle East must gain the U.N.'s imprimatur. Moreover, France's nuclear arsenal continues to assure it a place at high table with the superpowers, while its economic clout provides membership in the exclusive Group of Seven. Political punch aside, French humanitarian efforts overseas, such as the war-defying missions of the volunteer doctors known as Medecins sans Frontieres, remain leading lights of compassion.

Even in the image department, the hand wringing in Paris before the gulf war measured up favorably, in the end, against Germany's self-paralyzing angst. Bonn's inability to weigh in for battle against Iraq except as a financier was greeted across the Rhine with relief. France's strengthened transatlantic relations have also reinforced the case for keeping U.S. troops in Europe, which Paris endorses as protection against any resurgent Soviet threat and a means of ensuring that Germany remains anchored in the West.

Though Mitterrand continues to exploit the French position in the middle, signaling his country's potential for mischief in dealings with difficult regimes, he can now justify his approaches to China or Iran as those of an eclaireur, or scout, for American diplomacy. France's ace in the hole remains its latitude for independence, especially in framing an autonomous "defense identity" and common foreign policy for Europe. Says a senior French military officer: "We will always stand with the U.S. in the great battles of the West. After that, we again become a difficult ally."