Do Something . . . Anything

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Clinton feels the strength of the moral argument for action echoing around Washington but is unwilling to start something without knowing how he will end it. He would like to halt the Serbian aggressors in their tracks, but he wants to take steps that provide clear, achievable objectives and that will encourage rather than cut off a political process leading eventually to a negotiated solution to the tribal wars. If he chooses to bomb the Serbs, he wants to be convinced that bombs will in due course push them into some mutually acceptable agreement.

Above all, Clinton does not want to make an open-ended commitment of U.S. blood and treasure. Most of the Congress is not behind intervention, partly because no one is sure what might work. "Given the resources you're willing to devote to the problem," says Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "I think you have to lower your expectations about what you can accomplish." Members of Congress returned to Washington after the Easter recess with no feeling that their constituents were clamoring for the use of armed force. National opinion polls show that only about a quarter to a third of Americans favor military intervention.

After the Holocaust ceremony, the President said he accepted Wiesel's plea as a challenge to the West "to take further initiatives in Bosnia." In answer to questions at his press conference, he said he was convinced "the U.S. should lead" in trying to solve "clearly the most difficult foreign- policy problem we face." But he was not prepared to act unilaterally if the NATO allies, Russia and the U.N. Security Council did not support his proposals. "I do not think we should act alone," he said, "nor do I think we will have to."

Will anything work? The first Administration initiative -- a package of modest diplomatic measures announced on Feb. 10 -- is universally seen as a bust. Not only have negotiations on Bosnia failed but Serbian aggression has become even more brutal and more successful.

Aside from a handful of diplomatic gestures, such as opening an embassy in Sarajevo, the two new initiatives being urged on Clinton most strongly by official and unofficial advisers are to lift the embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia and to use air power against Serbian guns and supply routes. British diplomats say one of the others is a proposal from London for a military land, sea and air blockade that would completely seal off Serbia from contact with the rest of the world. Still another is the possibility of establishing and protecting "safe havens" for Muslims in the remnants of Bosnia.

Bombing Serbian gun positions or supply lines delivers a satisfying sense of muscularity, but some Pentagon officials argue that it would have little impact on ending the war. The problems are many: collateral damage, danger to U.S. pilots, highly mobile targets, retaliation against U.N. forces.

Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is an attractive option because it has a low risk of drawing the U.S. into a ground war, turning the responsibility for self-preservation over to the Bosnian Muslims. Unless Washington delivers the weapons, an end to the embargo could bring in suppliers, such as Iran, that the U.S. would not welcome in the Balkans, and would probably bring Russian weapons surging into Serbia as well.