The Political Interest Playing Nuclear Poker

Does North Korea have the bomb, and if it does, what should be done about it? Kim Il Sung offered an essentially hollow capitulation last week, a promise to permit inspections of all but the key nuclear sites, which could settle the matter. So the world -- and Bill Clinton -- will be left to ponder those questions, perhaps indefinitely. What to do?

First, assume North Korea already has two crude nuclear devices, as those who are paid to know such things assume.

Second, understand the key players' views and motivations. South Korea, the presumptive first target of any attack from the North, is against backing Kim into a corner, a result it fears economic sanctions would accomplish. What Seoul wants least is responsibility for an economically devastated North. "We're content with a divided peninsula," says a South Korean diplomat familiar with the huge absorption costs borne by West Germany's embrace of the East.

Japan is happy with the status quo too. Tokyo's joint security treaty with Washington allows its defense budget to remain low, and it abhors even thinking about developing a nuclear hedge against North Korea's capabilities.

China welcomes the current confusion as an aid to retaining its preferred- trading status with the U.S. "Beijing figures its chances improve if it is perceived as the single source capable of constructively pressuring Pyongyang," explains an Administration sinologist, even though the evidence suggests China did little if anything to encourage Kim's latest maneuver.

Finally, despite its public huffing, the U.S. seems to be taking North Korea's supposed nuclear capacity in stride. Whatever exists is "not militarily significant," says U.S. Pacific Commander Charles Larson. Yet, adds the admiral, it is obviously "significant politically." Which is why no one tells the truth -- neither the West nor the North Koreans. "As soon as the bombs' existence is confirmed unambiguously," says a State Department official, "you have to do something about it. Better to let what is be and move to cap it at the present low-threat level."

"North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb," Clinton said firmly last November, no doubt recalling that the last time a U.S. Administration got Korea wrong, the body-bag business became a growth industry because Harry Truman took too long to give 'em hell. "Drawing a line in the sand early is what you should have done in the '50s," says a Japanese diplomat. "Today you should be softer. Kim's bottom line is still his regime's survival, but victory is defined differently this time. Kim knows the way to win in the '90s is by joining the Asian economic boom rather than by armed conflict. Clinton has already made one mistake. He should have told Kim, 'You say you don't have the Bomb. O.K., we believe you.' Then, quietly, he should have begun to deal. Now, when everything is public and so much pride is on the line on both sides, it's harder."

But not impossible. "We'll certainly consider trading with them if they don't transfer their technologies to other nations," admits an Administration official. "It's the proliferation possibilities that really worry us."