A GOOD SEASON FOR WAR

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All this in Croatia, which the U.N. liked to consider a tenuous success compared to the ongoing debacle in Bosnia. The attack on Zagreb marked a new nadir of humiliation for U.N. peacekeepers, who were variously ignored by attacking Croats, taken hostage by Krajina Serbs and dropped into the midst of a fire fight when they returned to the sector on Thursday under the scant cover of a U.N.-declared cease-fire. U.N. special representative Yasushi Akashi, who is head of the U.N.'s peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia, managed after the second round of rockets to engineer a cease-fire in Sector West. But when he tried to fly into the sector on Thursday, the Croatians would not allow his helicopter to land. "Akashi has become a comic figure," says Jens Reuter of the Sudost Institute in Munich.

Or a pathetic one. Last week began with the spectacle of Akashi standing in the rain at Sarajevo's airport -- closed for aid flights since Bosnian Serbs shot up an American cargo plane on April 13 -- trying to spin into a success his failure to extend the cease-fire between the government and the Serbs. No one had signed anything, but all sides, he said, had "undertaken a solemn engagement to show maximum restraint." Unfortunately, even with a cease-fire agreement, the parties have not exactly been known for their restraint. While the cease-fire was still in effect, the Bosnian Serbs repeatedly shelled the so-called safe area of Bihac, and the Bosnian government launched successful offensives on Mount Vlasic to the northwest of Sarajevo and the Majevica Hills to the northeast.

Diplomacy has failed to move the conflict in Bosnia even a little toward a just peace-or any peace. Right now the Bosnian Serbs control 70% of Bosnian territory. The so-called Contact Group -- he U.S., Britain, Russia, France and Germany -- has a plan that requires the Serbs to reduce their share of the land to 49%. They have shown little interest. "We're not holding our breath for the Serbs to accept [the Contact Group plan] as the 'basis' for talks, the 'starting point' or anything else," says a top Administration official.

Hardly surprising, since the Bosnian Serbs and their reluctant patron in Belgrade, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, are masters at exploiting great power differences. The Russians tend to favor the Serbs, their historic allies; the Americans tend to favor the Muslims, who they feel are the clear victims; and the French are masterfully temporizing, which infuriates the Russians and the Americans. "I think there's a willingness to declare the Contact Group dead, but the alternative is so bleak that no one wants to face it," says a U.S. official.

Lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians, as advocated by U.S. Senate majority leader Robert Dole, would necessitate a withdrawal of U.N. troops by NATO forces, a dangerous operation that could prove unpalatable in Washington if it meant sending U.S. soldiers. What's more, it would probably trigger an immediate response from the already heavily armed Bosnian Serbs, resulting in what a U.N. official indelicately calls a "Dolocaust." The Pentagon opposes Dole's plan, and he has postponed bringing it to the Senate floor until June at the earliest. If Congress passes it, which is likely if only to embarrass Clinton, who castigated George Bush in 1992 for being weak on Bosnia, Clinton will certainly veto it.