TIME TO KEEP THE PROMISE

(2 of 3)

They will be part of a roughly 60,000-strong NATO contingent, known by the acronym I-FOR (Implementation Force), which will enforce peace for up to one year. As a concession to Moscow's touchiness about being locked out of a region where it has historic ties, Russian troops may participate as well, although their role has yet to be determined. "We are proposing a powerful force," said Perry. "If attacked by anyone, it will bring a large hammer down on them. It will be the biggest, the toughest and the meanest dog in town." In keeping with the cost of Pentagon hardware, the American contribution to the price tag on this hammer will come to about $1.5 billion.

Officials say the U.S. contingent will be "a pure transition force." This means troops will not be involved in "nation-building" tasks that can transform foreign troops into targets of terror: disarming combatants, policing cities, moving refugees back to their homes. Instead, soldiers will concentrate on guarding borders, enforcing cease-fires and keeping the warring parties separate. Once the region is stabilized, says a Pentagon spokesman, "we hope that the economic rebuilders, the refugee resettlers, the bridge builders, will come in and start laying a foundation for growth and prosperity in Bosnia."

That may sound impressive, but many lawmakers found the Administration's strategy ill-conceived. Several noted that while there is a detailed blueprint for getting troops into Bosnia, plans remain disturbingly vague on how anyone will know when it is time to go home. If the fighting resumes, will the peace enforcers simply pack up and leave? If so, when? What if peace holds only because I-FOR is there? Will it still depart? If so, at what point and at what cost? Ignoring such questions, which are essential to defining a mission, can make for confused soldiers. It can also make for dead ones, as demonstrated by deployments in Vietnam and Beirut, where these problems were never adequately addressed.

Surely one of the oddest features of the plan is the proposal for redressing the region's lopsided balance of power. The U.S. intends to ask the Bosnian Serbs to give up some of their heavy weapons; if they don't, the Americans want to use soldiers and civilian contractors to arm and train the Bosnian Muslim army. The Administration seems convinced that troops can do this and still remain evenhanded peacekeepers; critics say it's the fastest way to destroy the perception of neutrality, and the surest strategy for provoking the Serbs and Croatians. Perry, Christopher and Shalikashvili seemed unruffled by such issues, pointing out that it will be weeks before the Balkan leaders finish their haggling in Ohio--plenty of time, they said, to smooth out wrinkles in the strategy. "Do I believe we have a good solid plan?" remarked an official. "No. Will we get there in time? Yes."