A Call for American Consensus

The U.S. Senate's recent rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a huge disappointment to many Americans. The U.S.'s allies and friends responded to this vote with universal shock. I have been besieged by calls from around the globe. All express concern. Some commentators have used the vote to proclaim the death of arms control. But the obituaries are premature.

The CTBT and the larger challenge of reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are far too important to abandon. So the Administration is determined to continue fighting for the treaty. Approval of the pact means the U.S. would be joining with other nations to halt the development of more advanced nuclear arms and prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.

Unfortunately, as the CTBT vote reflects, the Administration and Congress have not yet agreed on a common post-cold war strategy for responding to these dangers. But the world's leading nation cannot remain divided on how to respond to the world's gravest threats. The Administration and Congress have worked together in the past on such key issues as the Chemical Weapons Convention and NATO enlargement. We must put aside partisan distractions and work together now.

A common strategy must recognize the need for 1) a strong national defense; 2) American leadership in nonproliferation; and 3) responding to new threats without reviving old ones. And, of course, whatever agreements we enter into--the CTBT included--must serve America's overall national-security interests. The CTBT would do that by impeding the development of advanced new arms by nuclear-weapons states and constraining the nuclear capabilities of countries that do not now have such weapons.

For example, in Asia the CTBT would make it harder for North Korea to advance a nuclear-weapons program or for China to develop the technology required to place multiple warheads atop a single mobile missile. The congressional committee investigating potential Chinese espionage concluded that it would be more difficult for Beijing to exploit secrets it may have acquired from the U.S. if it can't conduct nuclear tests.

Under the CTBT, America would gain the security benefits of outlawing nuclear tests by others, while locking in a technological status quo that is highly favorable to us. We have conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests--hundreds more than anyone else. We do not need more tests to protect our security. Would-be proliferators or modernizers, however, must test if they are to develop the kind of advanced, compact nuclear weapons that are most threatening.

During the abbreviated Senate consideration of CTBT, many Senators raised concerns about verification and preservation of a safe, reliable nuclear deterrent. We take these concerns seriously and are prepared to explore a variety of ways to resolve them. We believe that, with hard work, favorable action on CTBT will become possible.

A second challenge we must meet is posed by the combination of our development of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system and our deep stake in preserving the benefits of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which bars such systems.