4 Dots American Intelligence Failed To Connect

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--Two FBI analysts detailed to the CIA ask the INS for information on al-Midhar and al-Hazmi. On Aug. 22, the INS tells them al-Midhar returned to the U.S. in July. The CIA puts al-Midhar and al-Hazmi on the TIPOFF watch list and asks the FBI to look for them. The FBI assigns one agent, with no counterterrorism experience, to track down al-Midhar. Only on 9/11, in the hours before the attacks, does he ask the Los Angeles field office for help. Earlier, a New York FBI agent involved in the Cole criminal investigation asks colleagues for more information about al-Midhar but is told "the wall" separating the agency's functions prevents him from working on an intelligence case.

WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED?

At several points the CIA could have asked the FBI to trace the two hijackers' activities in the U.S., which would have led to 9/11 pilot Hani Hanjour, who was training with al-Hazmi. The State Department could have put them on the TIPOFF list much earlier. The FAA could have put them on its no-fly list, keeping them off domestic flights.

3 JULY 10, 2001 -- THE PHOENIX MEMO

THE CLUE

Phoenix FBI agent Kenneth Williams sends a memo to two units at FBI headquarters in Washington and to the New York field office describing 10 foreign students at aviation schools who are under investigation for ties to Sunni extremists. Williams theorizes that bin Laden could be systematically sending students to study aviation in the U.S. and recommends that agents compile a list of such schools, establish contacts with them, discuss his theory with the rest of the intelligence community and obtain background information on foreign students applying to flight schools.

WHAT HAPPENED?

--Two FBI specialists in Washington--one in the radical fundamentalists unit, one in a unit dedicated to bin Laden--analyze the memo and consult two other specialists about the legal implications. On Aug. 7 they decide to close the case and come back to it when they have time.

--Three agents in the New York office read the memo but are not asked to take follow-up action. The terrorism unit in New York knows that bin Laden sent employees to U.S. flight schools in the past but believes he just wanted them to fly his private planes.

WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED?

--Two of the suspects Williams mentioned did have al-Qaeda links; one trained with Hanjour at an Arizona flight school. A thorough investigation of flight schools might have led to one in Florida where an instructor recalled the odd behavior of 9/11 pilots Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi or to a California outfit that expelled al-Hazmi and al-Midhar for lack of flight skills and poor English. Had Williams' memo been sent to all FBI field offices, it could have set off alarms at the Minneapolis field office when would-be pilot Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in August.

4 AUG. 13, 2001 -- THE 747 TRAINEE

THE CLUE