Chalabi's Fall From Grace

• Share

(2 of 2)

In Washington, Chalabi's light has dimmed as more and more experts like David Kay, former Bush chief weapons inspector, blame the I.N.C. for painting a bogus picture of Saddam's arsenal. Chalabi tells TIME, "It is unfair and astounding that I would be given such powers to affect a system. It's election season, and people want to seek scapegoats." But U.S. intelligence officials doubt the credibility of many of the sources provided by the I.N.C. An informant purported to have worked on underground storage sites for biochem weapons greatly "embroidered" his tales, a senior U.S. intelligence officer says. Another I.N.C. source provided corroborating reports that Saddam had mobile weapons labs, a charge Secretary of State Colin Powell presented before the U.N. in February 2003. Intelligence officials had red-flagged that source with a "fabricator notice," meaning the source was unreliable. The CIA says it missed the notice. Chalabi aides say he passed along the sources' information without vouching for it.

These days, Chalabi insists he harbors no grand political ambitions. "I have no desire to be a candidate for anything," he says. But Chalabi may try to make himself felt even if he is not named to the post-June government. He has positioned enough allies in Iraq's ministries to wield significant power behind the scenes. He is building a political machine for Iraq's elections, which are scheduled for next year. But if democracy does come, Chalabi's connections aren't likely to help him. "He's looking for a base of support," says Mahmoud Othman, a Kurd on the Governing Council. "But at this stage, anybody who wants to be elected needs to lobby for himself."

--By Johanna McGeary and Massimo Calabresi. With reporting by Brian Bennett, Hassan Fattah and Vivienne Walt/Baghdad