Campaign '04: The Vexations Of Voting Machines

• Share

(2 of 4)

The other concern about evoting is that some of the nation's top computer scientists and code crackers believe the systems are too vulnerable to tampering or simple breakdowns. "If you believe, as I do, that voting is one of our critical infrastructures, then you have to defend it like you do your power grid, your water supply," says former National Security Agency code breaker Michael Wertheimer. "That's not happening anywhere." And with a closely split electorate marching toward another presidential showdown, shaky voter confidence in the results could lead to another huge outcry or keep more people from going to the polls. With voter participation at a paltry 51.3% in 2000, Americans hardly need another reason not to vote.

There are many pluses to the ATM-like machines, most of which are made by three manufacturers. They are easy to use, can provide ballots in many languages and eliminate the problem of voters' choosing more than one candidate in a race. They can also be outfitted to allow disabled people to vote privately for the first time by, for instance, letting blind people use headphones to work through the process. Tests have shown that the machines count votes accurately--when nothing goes wrong.

But things do. Testing in Maryland, which has adopted a system made by Diebold, began to raise eyebrows. The system's potential vulnerability was first pointed out by Bev Harris, a Seattle-based publicist with a deep interest in voting rights and a deep skepticism about digital-age voting (her book, Black Box Voting, is the movement's gospel). Her discovery: the programming behind Diebold's software was available on an open Internet site, which meant that anyone with a little expertise and access to the voting equipment could subvert it. Harris sent the material to others. Soon computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice universities analyzed it, finding a host of security flaws like the presence of critical passwords in the programming. Mischiefmakers who gained access to the smart cards that voters must insert in the machines, or to the machines' memory cards, could use the passwords to cast bogus votes or change tallies. That prompted the state of Maryland to commission a review by research firm SAIC. It agreed that Diebold's system was "at high risk of compromise." Then, four months ago, a state legislative committee hired Wertheimer, the code cracker, and his crew to "red team" the system--assemble it in a mock polling place and try to screw it up.