Fight Or Flight: Can Iraqis Do The Job?

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U.S. officials are running out of patience with the Iraqis' failure to step up. "If you do not defend your beloved country, it will not be saved," Bremer said in an address to the Iraqi public last Friday. And yet some of the blame for the impotence of the Iraqi security and police forces lies with U.S. mismanagement. Military officials say the Pentagon's decision to disband the Iraqi military last May was a disaster, in part because it deprived the new forces of any central command. In its rush to get the Iraqis onto the streets, the U.S. never settled on who should train the new forces; instead, responsibility was divided among the military, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the State Department. The Pentagon has since decided to place all Iraqi forces under Centcom, but military experts say thousands of Iraqis have already been pushed into duty without adequate training.

Meanwhile, U.S. Army officials canceled the $327 million contract to supply Iraqi forces with equipment, such as body armor and weapons, after they concluded "ambiguities" in the contract's language might expose the U.S. government to legal challenges from losing bidders. Major General Charles Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, says that when his troops left Iraq in January, the Iraqis under their command were still waiting for their gear. "It never came on my watch," he says. Testifying before Congress last week, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz blasted Washington "bureaucracy" for the Iraqis' lack of firepower. "A lot of the equipment problems, frankly, are an embarrassment to the United States of America," he said. Says retired General Barry McCaffrey, who commanded an Army division during Gulf War I: "The money, the equipment and the uniforms have all been screwed up from the start."

All those failings are manifest at Camp Eagle in Sadr City, where members of the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division have assumed responsibility for training and overseeing the 306th Battalion of the ICDC. Most of the members of the battalion are former day laborers who have not undergone physical or medical screening. They are supposed to show up at 8:30 a.m., though there is no penalty for tardiness. After a short workout, a good deal of horseplay and some training, the Iraqis take on basic duties, like manning traffic-control checkpoints. At 2 p.m. they eat lunch and go home. The soldiers working with the Iraqis--senior officers insisted they be identified only as "advisers"--do not hold out much hope that their charges will be prepared to take over from the U.S. anytime soon. "They have no sense of discipline," says one sergeant. "We do our job and think of chow after. They want to break for chow as quickly as possible." But the Americans also sympathize with the Iraqis' complaints that they can't stand up to anyone with such shoddy equipment. "They don't have their own flak jackets--the fastest ones get them, the rest go without," says one U.S. adviser. "Their weapons are old and unreliable." As a result, says another adviser, "when they go out with us they feel like amateurs. It's s___ for morale."