

Give and Take. Fixing Pakistan will require doing deals with the key players

**WHAT DO THEY
WANT FROM THE
U.S.?**

**WHAT DOES
THE U.S. WANT
IN RETURN?**



**PAKISTANI PRESIDENT
ASIF ALI ZARDARI**

Long-term commitment to economic aid; ties closer to civilian administration than to military leadership; fewer missile strikes on Pakistani targets, which inflame tribal militancy and demoralize the military; pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir issue

Clean, efficient government; reform of democratic institutions like the judiciary; a crackdown on Islamic militants; continued dialogue with India



**PAKISTANI ARMY CHIEF,
GENERAL ASHFAQ KAYANI**

Continued military aid, both cash and hardware, like F-16 fighters; continued close military ties and preservation of army's dominant role in Pakistani affairs; pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir issue

A crackdown on al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in the tribal north; an offensive against homegrown Islamic militant groups; less military meddling in politics and the economy; ironclad security of nuclear weapons



**AFGHAN PRESIDENT
HAMID KARZAI**

Continued support for his administration in spite of its corruption; economic assistance; more troops to fight the Taliban; continued training for the Afghan security forces; pressure on Pakistan to crack down on Taliban sanctuaries

Clean government, to reduce grievances that fuel the Taliban; a tougher line against opium smuggling; easing up on provocative language against Pakistan



INDIA

Deeper economic and military ties; nuclear-power technology; pressure on Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups that target Indian cities; no attempt to mediate on Kashmir

Patience with Pakistan as it combats militancy; continued dialogue with Islamabad; easing up on provocative military activity near the Pakistani border; some progress on resolving Kashmir

Armies built for conventional warfare don't easily make the transition to counterterrorism, as U.S. commanders discovered in Iraq. Pakistan's generals have shown no enthusiasm for such a change, despite a massive infusion of U.S. military aid meant to make it happen. Much of that money has been stolen or spent to defend against an attack from India; little has reached the border with Afghanistan. Army chief Ashfaq Kayani has made some effort to take on the Taliban and other militant groups, but fitfully and with mixed results.

So the challenge for Holbrooke, says Fair, "is to thread two needles at the same time... He has to get the Pakistani army to step up the fight against extremists, even as he's telling the generals, 'Sorry, guys, we're making the civilians your bosses.'" In the past, the military has actively undermined every effort to put it under civilian control; expect more of the same. There are not many carrots the U.S. can dangle before Kayani to get him to change old habits. But the Biden-Lugar bill does provide some leverage: it requires \$1 billion in military aid to be conditional on more effort by the Pakistani military to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and become more accountable and transparent. The U.S. can nudge Kayani along, says Stephen Cohen, another Brookings expert on South Asia, by providing him only with equipment

useful for low-intensity conflict rather than with the F-16 jets, useful for conventional warfare, that Pakistan wants.

Disturbingly, the one area in which the U.S. has absolutely no influence is the security of Pakistan's nukes. The military won't let the U.S. anywhere near the arsenal. So the only way to avoid the nightmare of nuclear weapons in the hands of extremists is to trust in the Pakistani military's safeguards—and pray that Zardari and Kayani get serious about eliminating the extremists.

Hope India Helps

IF THERE IS ONE THING ON WHICH OUTSIDE observers of the linked challenges of Pakistan and Afghanistan agree, it is that soothing regional tensions is an essential part of any solution. Pakistan, seeing Indian investment in Afghanistan, fears being encircled by its old enemy. Then there is the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, the Himalayan territory that both nations claim. During the presidential-election campaign, Obama said repeatedly that resolving the Kashmir issue is a key to peace across South Asia.

Both Zardari and Kayani will seek from Holbrooke an assurance that the U.S. will pressure India to resolve Kashmir. But Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is unlikely to play ball. India is intractably op-

posed to any outside mediation on Kashmir, and lobbied successfully to have the matter removed from Holbrooke's mandate. Especially after last November's terrorist attacks on Mumbai—blamed on a Pakistan-based group with long links to Islamabad's intelligence services—any hint of a concession to Pakistan would be hugely unpopular in India. The U.S. has some cards to play: it can offer India nuclear technology under a deal signed by the Bush Administration, closer cooperation on counterterrorism, and military assistance. But if a Pakistan-based group mounts another terrorist strike on Indian soil, the U.S. can kiss goodbye any lingering hope that New Delhi will do much to help ease tensions in the region.

Should that happen—and Pakistan's democrats continue their fractious, venal ways, while its soldiers pocket aid and dream of fighting India—the U.S. would be back where it started. It would be limited, once again, to lobbing missiles at terrorist camps in Pakistan, inevitably killing civilians in the process, while uniting all Pakistanis in hatred of the U.S. for sullyng their nation's sovereignty.

Recent experience suggests that is the worst option of all. But so far, no alternative looks easy to deliver. Good luck, Mr. Holbrooke. —WITH REPORTING BY MARK THOMPSON AND MASSIMO CALABRESI/WASHINGTON

FROM LEFT: RICK GERSHON—GETTY; JOHN MOORE—GETTY; KRISTOFFER TRIPPLAR—GETTY