Washington's Worst-Kept Secret: Changes Are Coming in Iraq Policy

There will be things in his panel's report that the Administration won't like, Baker has said, and the former Secretary of State has made a point of emphasizing the need for the U.S. to seek agreement with Syria and Iran on steps to stabilize Iraq. "It's not appeasement to talk to your enemies," he has said, in an apparent rebuke to the current administration's refusal to have direct talks with both countries, in addition to North Korea.

The Iraq Study Group's report, of course, won't in itself set policy, and White House spokesman Tony Snow has warned (a bit defensively) that the President has no plans to "outsource" Iraq policy to the group. Nonetheless, its bipartisan and foreign policy credentials make it very likely to shape the parameters of debate on Iraq.

Baker's panel won't offer a magic bullet, for the simple reason that there isn't one. Even if the Bush Administration did swallow its rhetoric and deal with Tehran and Damascus, achieving a consensus on the distribution of power in Iraq between Iran and the Arab regimes would be a Herculean feat of diplomacy — and the political price set by Iran, in particular, might be beyond what the Administration is willing to pay. A phased withdrawal of troops carries major risks; so does partitioning Iraq or turning to a new "strongman" (the latter two options are not reportedly under consideration by the panel, but do arise in Washington debates). Each option carries as many, if not more, perils than prospects of success. But the very fact that the discussion in Washington has reached this point is a clear sign of an emerging consensus that a failed policy must be changed.