Relief at an agreement with President Milosevic is tempered by anxiety over the dangerous loopholes

RICHARD HOLBROOKE EMERGED LAST WEEK from more than 50 hours of talks with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to announce a dramatic "road map" to solution of the conflict in the rebellious southern Serbian province of Kosovo. Milosevic had agreed to a Western "verification mission" made up of 2,000 observers on the ground and unarmed NATO planes in the air, and had promised major political concessions on the future self-governance of Kosovo. After months of intransigence, it seemed, Milosevic was ready to comply with Western demands to stop yet another round of brutal bloodletting in the Balkans.

Not quite. Amid relief at a deal that held in abeyance threatened NATO air strikes, few noticed that the Yugoslav leader had not agreed in writing to a key demand: withdrawal of much of the Serb army and police troops who had killed hundreds of Kosovars and driven more than a quarter million from their homes.

For U.S. envoy Holbrooke, it was a third attempt at making peace in Kosovo, where a restive 90% ethnic Albanian population is ruled by a Serb minority that seized control of all the organs of power in a 1991 crackdown. Talks in May turned to disaster when Milosevic used them as a cover to launch a widespread attack against villages thought to harbor rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Before it was over, between 10,000 and 13,000 civilians had fled across the border to Albania. Holbrooke's second attempt in June amounted to little more than a fact-finding mission. It slowed only temporarily a Serb village-burning campaign that would send an estimated 250,000 from their homes, as many as 50,000 of whom remain in the hills living in makeshift shelters.

THIS TIME, THOUGH, HOLBROOKE HAD THE CREDIBLE threat of NATO force behind him. With the inclusion in the negotiating team of U.S. Air Force Lieut. Gen. Michael Short--the man who picks the targets for NATO --Milosevic had reason to assume that the West was serious. The demands were plain enough: Milosevic should draw down his troops in Kosovo, start serious negotiations with the Kosovars and allow safe, unhindered movement for refugees, humanitarian groups and war crimes investigators. On the political and humanitarian sides, the deal showed signs of life almost immediately. The Serbian government published 11 principles for a political solution and a timetable for its implementation. The main concessions included elections within nine months leading to broad self-rule for Kosovars, local control of community police forces and an amnesty for those who fought in the conflict unless they had committed war crimes. Aid agencies reported easier access around Kosovo.

But on the military front, Holbrooke left Milosevic wiggle-room on the numbers of Interior Ministry and army forces allowed to remain in the province. The Serbs signed up only for "the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression," a term vague enough to enable Milosevic to quibble later over details and definitions. NATO generals meeting with Milosevic Thursday stressed specific numbers, but Holbrooke and the Western policymakers faced a negotiating dilemma. The West does not wish to see Yugoslavia disintegrate further with the secession of Kosovo because it fears theprecedent of unilateral border changes and the spreading of Albanian minority revolution to Macedonia, so some force is required to keep the separatist K.L.A. from taking over. If NATO won't do it, only Serb forces can. "We can't pull out everybody because...the K.L.A. would take over," says a Western diplomat close to the talks. But with winter approaching, the U.S. and its allies could not stomach a humanitarian catastrophe as refugees struggled to survive in the hills.

The hope is that the 2,000-member verification mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, combined with unarmed NATO overflights, can do the job. But critics say the 2,000 monitors will be more like hostages than verifiers. NATO will fear retaliatory attacks against the monitors if it strikes Serb targets for breaches of the agreement. "As long we have 2,000 potential hostages in Kosovo, our leverage against Milosevic is severely reduced," says Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution. David Johnson, U.S. ambassador to O.S.C.E., says the reaction to such supposedly random attacks would be resolute. "We roll up and get out and we're back where we are now [with the threat of air strikes]." He says that NATO will have some forces ready to withdraw the "verifiers" if needed.

Another threat comes from the bellicose K.L.A. After being crushed by a Serb summer offensive they learned they can fight only as hit-and-run guerrillas. But even hit-and-run tactics can wreak havoc on a fragile peace. "The K.L.A. is never going away," says the Western diplomat close to the talks. Besides the destabilizing K.L.A. there are plenty of disgruntled minority Serbs in the region who feel Milosevic is selling them out. "Evil-intentioned people, within and without the country, should be told to keep their hands off Kosovo," read a post-deal statement by the Serbian Resistance Movement, a radical anti-Albanian group based in Kosovo. "Every Serb, peasant or soldier, is ready to defend his Serbian land, his offspring and Orthodoxy." But there was ever-diminishing public criticism of Milosevic's deal as his myrmidons closed down three of the country's most popular independent newspapers in a continuing crackdown on the free press.

As he headed into the last hours of negotiation, Holbrooke was in a position of considerable strength. NATO had just passed its activation order and set a 96-hour deadline for Milosevic's compliance. With the clock ticking, the pressure would only have mounted and Milosevic's concessions would only have become greater. But within six hours of the issuance of the activation order, Holbrooke announced his deal--complete with loopholes--and headed for the airport, tossing aside what many considered an enviable negotiating position. With Milosevic's history of reneging on commitments, Holbrooke may soon find himself back in the Balkans, trying to do it a fourth time.

Questions

1. How did Richard Holbrooke's third mission to the Balkans differ from his two previous ones?

2. What are the terms of the deal Holbrooke reached with Slobodan Milosevic? Why have some observers criticized the agreement?

Answers

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