Hints of the fury that struck East Timor had been apparent since January. When Habibie unexpectedly offered locals a referendum on independence, militia groups who wanted continued ties with Jakarta began to organize and acquire guns. Even before the vote, independence campaigners were intimidated and dozens killed. Although the militias were clearly supported by elements of the Indonesian armed forces, the international community in May agreed to entrust security during the referendum period to Indonesia. It was a fatal misjudgment, as the bloodbath showed. Why the killing? There were all kinds of theories. Perhaps the military, angered at having to give up territory it had fought so hard to pacify, wanted to get a few last licks in before pulling out. The military leadership was also clearly afraid that other restive provinces like Aceh and Irian Jaya would use the East Timor precedent to push for their own secessionŠand so, the theory goes, they wanted to make an example of East Timor. Others argued that regional commanders intended to defy Jakarta and reduce East Timor to a state of anarchy to cancel out entirely the result of the referendum. "The military feels insulted," says Harry Tjan Silalahi, a think-tank director in Jakarta. "Some may want to restore order, but those in the field have a much different purpose."

Violence is not new to East Timor, an arid territory about the size of Connecticut. Colonized by the Portuguese in the 16th century, it was invaded by Indonesian troops in December 1975 with the tacit consent of President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Jakarta's forces met bitter resistance-some 200,000 East Timorese died as a result of the occupation, and Indonesia's annexation of East Timor was never recognized by the U.N.

It was to get rid of this diplomatic embarrassment that President Habibie proposed the referendum, ignoring the warnings of powerful military leaders, including armed forces chief General Wiranto. Habibie should have listened. Within hours of the Sept. 4 announcement that nearly 80% of the electorate had voted for independence, Dili and other towns echoed with gunfire as militiamen took over the streets, unchecked by the military. Civilians began pouring into churches, convents and U.N. compounds seeking safety. "If there is a devil, these militia guys work for him," said a photographer evacuated from Dili.

If there was any light to be found in East Timor last week, it was in the U.N. compound in Dili, where a small group of aid workers kept up a heroic mission. Though Annan had ordered the compound shut on Wednesday, his local representatives revolted: fearing the 1,500 refugees in the compound would be massacred once the foreigners left, the staff members announced they would stay.

The future for East Timor is uncertain. Much of the territory's infrastructure has been demolished, and even with topflight international help, it will take years to sculpt the shell-ruined jungles and villages of East Timor into a real nation. In Jakarta, politicians seemed to be coming to terms with the fact that East Timor must be freed. But that may be a more difficult sell on the streets of Dili, where pro-Jakarta militias must still be disarmed and-in some cases-arrested and tried for their crimes. That task now belongs to the U.N. As well as two other tasks: resettling the nation's 300,000 refugees and asking the rest of the world how, less than six months after Kosovo, it allowed this kind of civil horror to strike again.

Questions

1. What does the writer mean when he says that "the tragedy is that everybody saw East Timor's violence coming"?
2. What theories account for the violence in Dili?

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