Next day, in consultation with the U.S., Golda Meir drew up the statement she would make to the Assembly, then cabled it to Israel for Cabinet approval. Because of the time differential and deciphering delays, the Israeli Cabinet session did not get under way until Friday at 3 p.m. Ministers argued until after the evening star rose--the first time in Israel's stormy history that a Cabinet had ever extended its deliberations into the Sabbath. The two Religious Front Ministers were gravely troubled about the Sabbath; four holdout ministers were sullen and bitter about B-G's decision. Just as bitter were Moshe Dayan and his army staff when Ben-Gurion called them into his living room afterwards and informed them.
Too Many Assumptions? In New York Golda Meir went to the Assembly tribune before packed galleries to announce Israel's decision: "Full and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip, in compliance with the resolution of Feb. 2." Israel's action she explained in matter-of-fact tones, was based on three "assumptions": 1) that freedom of navigation would prevail in the Gulf of Aqaba; 2) that the Gaza Strip would be administered by the UNEF "until there is a peace settlement . . . or definite agreement on the future of the Gaza"; 3) that Israel reserved the right under the Article 51 selfdefense guarantee of the U.N. Charter to send its ships through the gulf "by armed force" if there should be interference, and to "defend its rights" in the Gaza Strip if raids should start again.
The U.S.'s Henry Cabot Lodge followed immediately with a general endorsement of Israel's decision. But on the future of the Gaza Strip he limited the U.S. commitment to upholding Hammarskjold's view that it must be worked out "within the framework of the armistice agreement" of 1949. France's Guillaume GeorgesPicot, speaking later, explicitly endorsed the Israeli "assumptions" as "legitimate and reasonable."
By Radio & Press. At 8:30 next morning Ben-Gurion snapped on his bedside portable transistor radio and glumly listened to the news of the U.N. session. He was startled by the Lodge declaration: under those terms, the Egyptians could conceivably return to Gaza practically as soon as the Israelis pulled out.
As the word of withdrawal spread through Israel, settlers in the exposed Negev settlements stirred in anger. With Israel's army in Gaza, they had slept easier of late. In Ben-Gurion's old community of Sde Boker wooden watchtowers had been left unmanned, and herders had lost the habit of taking guns when they traipsed out with their flocks. Was this all to be undone?
