Q & A: Lieut. General David Richards

Afghanistan is NATO's first mission outside of European borders. How important is this?
This is a hugely important operation for NATO. NATO nations understand that this is the case and I have full support from the lowest private soldier to the Secretary General and all the presidents and prime ministers involved. I am very confident we will succeed. We've got many more troops than the US coalition has been able to have here. We can refocus and reprioritize things because of our greater numbers. By building on the excellent foundations [the Americans] have bequeathed us and by incorporating many American troops I have every confidence that we will go from strength to strength.

Violence is at its worst in the south since 2001. Are you prepared?
We knew right from the outset that this was a combat operation. My headquarters have been at it now for 15 months. The troop-contributing nations are absolutely trained at the tactical level for what we are about to do. And I have total confidence in them. There is no doubt though that troops, when they are first confronted by a real enemy take time to get into their stride. We all know how it is with rookie soldiers and we must expect them to take time. Statistically, when we are confronted by large numbers, the coalition and the alliance has always come up on top. I see no reason why this should change. [But] I'm more likely to try to facilitate reconstruction and development than just fight. We can do more of that given our numbers.

Are NATO member nations prepared for casualties?
I haven't had to get involved with that because that is the role of the political leaders in each of the nations. But like them, I think this operation—and this is a view shared by my soldiers—is an enormously important thing to succeed in. We can't afford to let Afghanistan drift back to what it was before 9/11. I feel a moral obligation to help these people who have suffered enormously over the past 30 years, and who want us to succeed. I am determined that we will do that.

How will NATO's approach to security differ from that of the Americans?
We are not going to do things differently per se, but we are going to be able to emphasize different aspects of the operation because I've got more troops and a lot more nations that want to contribute resources. I am particularly keen on creating an environment in which people can more confidently go about their business. [To ensure this] I will create zones of security [where] a much more rapid delivery of reconstruction development can take place. Those who are not in the zones will be saying to the so-called Taliban and others, "look at the roads, look at the construction, look at the micro power projects that are being brought in rapidly. You get out of our village so we can get into the zone." The aim is that both physically and psychologically these zones of security are spread ineluctably and at some point are joined. I think that is a sound strategy in which to base a long term campaign.

Do you have enough resources to build those zones?
We have a lot of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police coming out of the schools all the time, but how do we actually employ them? My belief is that they are best employed in a way that best reflects their standards of training. And that is in broadly static tasks: securing the zones. My more mobile troops will be employed in the more demanding military roles predominantly outside the zones, but absolutely designed to secure them.

When you mention your mobile troops, you mean coalition forces.
Correct. Some ANA are up to it, but most are best employed on less demanding tasks. We will get them into those other areas, but today, with their state of training, and their equipment, it's better not to test them too much. Any good commander employs his troops in a way that is tailored to their ability.

Where is the line between the development side of your mission and the combat side?
They are absolutely intertwined. The whole purpose of our operation is to facilitate reconstruction and development. How do you best do that? You can either go out seeking the Taliban wherever they are and slowly grind them down, or you can construct a plan that more directly links in to what is going on in a valley or a village. I am more inclined to do the latter.

If Taliban are spotted in a village where you are building a road, how will you react?
People have said I am taking a people friendly approach, but that does not exclude being a very hard soldier when it's required, absolutely not. If they were interrupting the building of a road, then we would most certainly go and deal with them militarily. There may be another way of dealing with them non-militarily; I don't know what that might be, but I wouldn't automatically say that the only way is to kill them, though I suspect and anticipate that will be the case. Within my zones of security we shouldn't too often get into that situation.

And if you have to cross a field of opium poppies to get to that village?
You will not see any NATO troops lopping off poppy heads. That is someone else's task, and other than being kept in the picture on where it is going to happen, we will have nothing to do with that. We have got to deal with opium; the international community will not have succeeded here while that scourge exists. But it's making sure the order in which we do these things is sensible. And it may be that money is better spent today on building up the police force, rather than just eradicating, so that next year the police will be in a position to deal with it. And that larger police force will enable us to create the effects on the ground that give the farmer encouragement to do something different.

And the ongoing search for Osama bin Laden?
That is not my task. The US led coalition retains the counterterrorism role. I'm conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, which is conducted differently than a counter terrorism operation—which is unequivocally seeking out and destroying or capturing Osama bin Laden and his ilk. I'm not doing that. The insurgent is someone who trying to change the government. Clearly if it's an Arab terrorist or an al Qaeda operative firing on a NATO soldier, neither I nor any of his political leaders expect [the soldier] to say, "hang on, can you just tell me whether you are al Qaeda or someone else?" before he fires back. The two operations, while we like to think we are keeping in each other's minds, are quite different and conducted differently.

U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neuman has said that the insurgency isn't gaining strength so much as that the government is weak. What are your thoughts?
This is a key issue, and I share the analysis. In Afghanistan, [starting] from about the late 70s, the middle class and civil servants actually ceased to exist. Most ministries today are led by people who have just a very basic grounding [in government], and there is just this woeful shortage of capacity. The younger ones, who will inevitably succeed in due course, are still learning; that will take 10 years. There is at least one generation that this country is missing, and we need to accept that. I think it's best to accept and utilize traditional Afghan ways of doing things, such as the provincial councils, the shuras and the tribal leaders. Let them have a sense of ownership, and then we will start seeing a change on the ground much more quickly.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the violence in Southern Afghanistan is due as much to tribal conflict, corruption and drugs as to the Taliban. How do you tackle a complex and evolving enemy?
Much of the fighting in Helmand [in southern Afghanistan] today is a result of narco-lords paying either so-called Taliban or others to fight, which is why coordinating our efforts with the poppy elimination program and alternative livelihoods is absolutely vital. A hell of a lot of the Taliban are actually young men who have been recruited because they have nothing better to do, there is no employment opportunity in their villages. It is important that we start to provide better employment.

So you are optimistic?
If I didn't have optimism about what we are doing, I shouldn't be here. We've got to give people confidence that what we are doing is right and that we will be successful. That said, I am not for one moment complacent about the task ahead—most importantly, about the importance of insuring our soldiers' lives are safeguarded. That is very important to me and to all my subordinate commanders right down the chain of command.