North Korea and Iran Crises May Force the U.S. to Choose

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mounting diplomatic crisis over North Korea's threatened A-bomb test and Iran's refusal to heed demands to cease uranium-enrichment bring U.S. foreign policy to a crossroads. Until now, the Bush Administration has avoided choosing between regime change and diplomatic engagement in both cases, preferring an ambiguous policy that sat somewhere between the two and reflected its own longstanding divisions over how to deal with the President's "Axis of Evil." But now pressure will grow to make a tough choice on both fronts — and live with the consequences.

The Iraq war has underscored the basic reality that the U.S. is unable to topple the regimes of Iran and North Korea by force, and pressure from allies has led the Administration, somewhat reluctantly, to back limited diplomatic engagement on both fronts — the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, and the European Union negotiations with Iran. But all along the regime change crowd has remained sufficiently powerful to preclude direct talks with either regime, leaving the policy essentially in limbo.

Three of Washington's four partners in the Korea talks have urged Washington to talk directly to Pyongyang — Japan tends towards a hard line on North Korea, and tends to coordinate more closely with the U.S. Elsewhere, all of Washington's European allies believe the U.S. should talk directly to Iran in order to resolve the nuclear standoff. And in both cases, U.S. partners want Washington to take regime change off the table, instead offering security guarantees in exchange for good behavior. But the Administration has strenuously resisted this advice, even when it has come from senior Republicans in the foreign policy establishment.

Now, with the limited U.S diplomacy about to run its course without resolving either conflict, pressure from allies to try direct talks is almost certain to grow.

The six-party talks on North Korea have been dormant for a year, and North Korea has responded with escalating provocations: In July it tested a long-range missile, and now it has declared its intention to test a nuclear bomb. The U.S. and Japan responded to the missile test with a call for sanctions, and Washington has warned that it will not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea. Realistically, though, the only option for putting the squeeze on North Korea is to get both South Korea and China to cut the economic ties that keep North Korea afloat. And angry as both countries are at North Korea's defiance, they're loath to take steps that could cause a collapse of the regime, fearing possibly cataclysmic consequences — ranging from millions of starving refugees flooding across borders to military clashes. While China will certainly join with other countries in pressuring North Korea to refrain from testing a bomb, Chinese analysts say there's a limit to what Beijing can achieve through pressure, and that the new crisis raises the urgency for direct U.S. talks with Pyongyang, offering security guarantees as part of a denuclearization agreement.

The EU talks with Iran have been equally fruitless, failing to persuade Tehran to agree to suspend uranium enrichment as a precondition for negotiations over a comprehensive deal. The discussions will continue, but the U.S. will now begin seriously pressing for sanctions. Russia and China have opposed sanctions all along, and the Europeans are unlikely to agree to anything more than symbolic measures. The problem is that no one in Washington or anyone else really believes such sanctions will change Iran's attitude, while the Chinese, Russians and Europeans all share the goal of avoiding confrontation with Iran; most see that prospect as more immediately dangerous than anything currently happening in Iran's nuclear program. Given that the key U.S. allies here see neither sanctions nor military strikes as producing a happy outcome to the Iran standoff, you can expect the chorus of calls for direct talks between the U.S. and Iran only to grow.

Of course talking directly with either Pyongyang or Tehran will be the furthest thing from the Administration's mind right now, even more so because each has defied the preconditions demanded by Washington for making a deal. Yet, in the absence of any alternatives acceptable to the allies and partners whose support or consent would be required for any effective strategy, Team Bush may find itself finally forced to make a policy choice between engagement and regime change. The days of having it both ways be coming to an end.