Holding Fire in the Opium War?

The

backfiring of a NATO advertising campaign in southern Afghanistan illustrates the complexity of fighting an insurgency partly fueled by an illicit drug economy. For the past month the Western alliance's International Security Assistance Force, tasked with restoring Afghanistan's security and protecting its reconstruction effort, have been running a series of radio ads suggesting that local farmers would no longer be punished for growing opium poppies. NATO hoped its security effort would get better cooperation from the local population if its mission was separated from that of a widely resented poppy-eradication program. But the advertisements muddied the Afghan Government's unambiguous anti-narcotics message, which The backfiring of a NATO advertising campaign in southern Afghanistan illustrates the complexity of fighting an insurgency partly fueled by an illicit drug economy. For the past month the Western alliance's International Security Assistance Force, tasked with restoring Afghanistan's security and protecting its reconstruction effort, have been running a series of radio ads suggesting that local farmers would no longer be punished for growing opium poppies. NATO hoped its security effort would get better cooperation from the local population if its mission was separated from that of a widely resented poppy-eradication program. But the advertisements muddied the Afghan Government's unambiguous anti-narcotics message, which had just started to take root. "ISAF's message over the radio was a mistake," fumes Counter Narcotics minister Habibullah Qaderi. "What they said was a clear deviation from the Afghan government's policy against narcotics, which is banned in Afghanistan."

The campaign, which also included leaflets dropped throughout the province of Helmand, Afghanistan's center of opium production, told farmers, "The ANA [Afghan National Army] forces and ISAF forces will not eradicate your poppies, because ANA and ISAF forces know that the people there have no other income, that is why they are cultivating poppies." Last week the campaign was pulled after the complaints of several Afghan government leaders, but the damage may already be done. "We cannot bulldoze every field in Afghanistan. But we must always have the threat that we might eradicate the fields in order to have an impact," says Qaderi. "ISAF's message takes away that threat."

Although the Taliban is not directly involved in the production of opium, there is a clear link between poppy cultivation and the growing insurgency. The Taliban certainly benefits from protecting growers and smugglers, who fund the insurgency in order to sustain a climate of lawlessness that enables their trade. As Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, wrote last week, "As long as drugs, the chemicals used to make them, insurgents and laundered money can move freely across Afghanistan's borders, there will be no peace in the region."

The bulk of last year's record poppy harvest in Afghanistan — with a street value of as much as $3 billion — comes from Helmand, a fertile and well-irrigated swath of land that borders Pakistan's lawless Baluchistan province. On a helicopter ride over Helmand province in March the immensity of the eradication task was made obvious. Luminous green fields of young poppy plants spread for miles in every direction, punctuated by a few tiny plots scored with the delicate brown tracery of bulldozer tracks.

Most farmers had stood by in futile rage while their fields were plowed under, but in recent weeks they have started fighting back, adding fuel to an already raging insurgency that has roiled NATOs reconstruction plans for the region. It's easy to understand why NATO would want to differentiate its role from those tearing up farmer's fields. But it's a shortsighted solution for a long-standing problem, says one Western official who works on counter-narcotics issues. "ISAF is trying to win hearts and minds for themselves rather than for the country and the government. These ads are symptomatic of the quandary NATO has on how to deal with poppy. Drugs and insecurity are completely and utterly linked — you can't deal with one with out eliminating the other."

So far the Afghan Eradication Forces, with the help of U.S. Contractor DynCorp, has bulldozed about 21,000 hectares, compared to 15,300 last year. But that's a drop in the bucket compared to the 165,000 hectares estimated to have been planted this year. It has long been held that eradicating poppy production requires the option of viable alternative crops, but few compete economically with the poppy: Its sap — the raw base of heroin — can be stored indefinitely, and while wheat can be similarly stored, it fetches only a fraction of the price paid for poppy sap. And imports from Pakistan and World Food Program donations have actually driven down the local price of wheat, in some areas. Government price controls on wheat would be one solution, but subsidies are anathema to international policy makers in the fledgling financial sector. Besides, notes the World Food Program, "the price difference between a cash crop like opium and wheat is so large that the market price of wheat would never be an incentive for farmers switching crops. The incentive is that wheat farming is legal and protected."

NGOs have suggested several alternative crops, such as fruits, medicinal herbs or saffron, but each has its drawbacks. "An alternative crop doesn't just mean new seeds," says Qaderi. "It means roads to market, packaging facilities, training, debt servicing and marketing." That kind of development will take years, and patience is already growing thin. "It will take time," says Qaderi. "It took Thailand 20 years. And they at least had roads and schools and markets. Everything was destroyed in Afghanistan. We are starting at less than zero." had just started to take root. "ISAF's message over the radio was a mistake," fumes Counter Narcotics minister Habibullah Qaderi. "What they said was a clear deviation from the Afghan government's policy against narcotics, which is banned in Afghanistan."

The campaign, which also included leaflets dropped throughout the province of Helmand, Afghanistan's center of opium production, told farmers, "The ANA [Afghan National Army] forces and ISAF forces will not eradicate your poppies, because ANA and ISAF forces know that the people there have no other income, that is why they are cultivating poppies." Last week the campaign was pulled after the complaints of several Afghan government leaders, but the damage may already be done. "We cannot bulldoze every field in Afghanistan. But we must always have the threat that we might eradicate the fields in order to have an impact," says Qaderi. "ISAF's message takes away that threat."

Although the Taliban is not directly involved in the production of opium, there is a clear link between poppy cultivation and the growing insurgency. The Taliban certainly benefits from protecting growers and smugglers, who fund the insurgency in order to sustain a climate of lawlessness that enables their trade. As Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, wrote last week, "As long as drugs, the chemicals used to make them, insurgents and laundered money can move freely across Afghanistan's borders, there will be no peace in the region."

The bulk of last year's record poppy harvest in Afghanistan — with a street value of as much as $3 billion — comes from Helmand, a fertile and well-irrigated swath of land that borders Pakistan's lawless Baluchistan province. On a helicopter ride over Helmand province in March the immensity of the eradication task was made obvious. Luminous green fields of young poppy plants spread for miles in every direction, punctuated by a few tiny plots scored with the delicate brown tracery of bulldozer tracks.

Most farmers had stood by in futile rage while their fields were plowed under, but in recent weeks they have started fighting back, adding fuel to an already raging insurgency that has roiled NATOs reconstruction plans for the region. It's easy to understand why NATO would want to differentiate its role from those tearing up farmer's fields. But it's a shortsighted solution for a long-standing problem, says one Western official who works on counter-narcotics issues. "ISAF is trying to win hearts and minds for themselves rather than for the country and the government. These ads are symptomatic of the quandary NATO has on how to deal with poppy. Drugs and insecurity are completely and utterly linked — you can't deal with one with out eliminating the other."

So far the Afghan Eradication Forces, with the help of U.S. Contractor DynCorp, has bulldozed about 21,000 hectares, compared to 15,300 last year. But that's a drop in the bucket compared to the 165,000 hectares estimated to have been planted this year. It has long been held that eradicating poppy production requires the option of viable alternative crops, but few compete economically with the poppy: Its sap — the raw base of heroin — can be stored indefinitely, and while wheat can be similarly stored, it fetches only a fraction of the price paid for poppy sap. And imports from Pakistan and World Food Program donations have actually driven down the local price of wheat. Government price controls on wheat would be one solution, but subsidies are anathema to international policy makers in the fledgling financial sector. NGOs have suggested several alternative crops, such as fruits, medicinal herbs or saffron, but each has its drawbacks. "An alternative crop doesn't just mean new seeds," says Qaderi. "It means roads to market, packaging facilities, training, debt servicing and marketing." That kind of development will take years, and patience is already growing thin. "It will take time," says Qaderi. "It took Thailand 20 years. And they at least had roads and schools and markets. Everything was destroyed in Afghanistan. We are starting at less than zero."