Can Counter-Insurgency Succeed?

British military strategist Sir Robert Thompson compared counter-insurgency to fishing. "If the guerrillas can be isolated from the population, i.e., the 'little fishes' removed from 'the water,' then their eventual destruction becomes automatic," Thompson wrote in his 1966 book Defeating Communist Insurgency, perhaps the best single work on counter-insurgency theory.

Thompson, who died in 1992, knew both pursuits well. He was an avid outdoorsman. And in the early 1950s Thompson served as a senior commander in Malaya [now part of Malaysia], where British forces conducted the one truly successful counter-insurgency campaign in modern times. It was in Malaya where the so-called inkblot approach showed promise. Take territory bit by bit from insurgents, the thinking goes, and then ensure you never lose it again. Today, the Bush administration calls the same strategy "clear, hold and build."

But how long does it take? Some in Washington say the Bush administration has only until September in Iraq. Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, on Sunday said counter-insurgency operations in Iraq could take up to a decade. "In fact, typically, I think historically, counter-insurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 years," Petraeus told "Fox News Sunday" during an interview.

Historical examples of successful counter-insurgency campaigns running roughly 10 years are scant. The last time Americans had real success at counter-insurgency was more than 100 years ago, when roughly 70,000 U.S. troops successfully put down an insurgency in the Philippines over four years from 1898 to 1902. There U.S. forces used a combination of going native and outright brutality to cow guerrillas. The next noticeable success in counter-insurgency came during the conflict in Malaya, which lasted from 1952 to 1954. Other countries that have faced insurgencies in the past century or so have typically either become overwhelmed — or found some way to cope with them permanently.

Three countries stand out as nations that have been largely successful in dealing with high levels of organized violence over the kind of time-frame Petraeus seems to have in mind: Colombia, Israel and India. All three nations are working democracies with solid economies even though gruesome carnage is pretty much everyday life in some areas. Economic development in India, for example, spread rapidly through much of the country during the 1990s, even as the long-running insurgency in Kashmir quickened. Gross domestic product increased by more than a third during that time, rising from $317 billion to $457 billon. Other social development indicators tallied by the World Bank showed improvement, too. Infant mortality rates dropped. Literacy rose. All of this happened while Indian forces fought an unrelenting insurgency in Kashmir that has claimed an estimated 66,000 lives.

So, how do India, Colombia and Israel do it? They keep the violence out of the capitals and major cities for the most part, allowing normal life to go forward for a large share of the population, if not most of it. Think of it in terms of the adage about a tree falling in the woods. If 200 guys kill each other in the middle of desert, high on a mountaintop or deep in a jungle, does it make a sound? The answer, in terms of counter-insurgency strategy over the long term, is no. True, Bogota, Jerusalem and even New Delhi sometimes still shake with bombs. But the idea of a four-day curfew like the one imposed on Baghdad recently is unthinkable in any of those cities.

With violence rising even as all the surge troops fan out in Baghdad, Petraeus and other commanders in Iraq seem eager to promote a long vision of success where gains in the near term may remain unclear. But a look at counter-insurgency history shows that no real progress is made while urban centers remain uncontrolled, as most of Baghdad is. Until Baghdad can go for some time without a curfew, Petraeus' counter-insurgency clock stands still.