How India Views Pakistan's Turmoil

Having fought three wars against Pakistan, India pays close attention to the turbulent politics of its neighbor. And none of Pakistan's many coups and periods of martial law has caused as much apprehension in New Delhi as the recent actions of President Pervez Musharraf. India's security establishment views Musharraf's political troubles from the perspective of regional stability, sharing with Washington the concern that priority be given to the campaign against the forces of Islamist fundamentalism in Pakistan. To the extent that enforcing emergency rule occupies the security forces, Indian security experts say, the danger increases of escalating infiltration into India of militants from Pakistan. Some also fear that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, which India has long accused of training and funding terror operations across India and South Asia, may activate sleeper cells in India and elsewhere to deflect attention from events in Pakistan. And India has more reason than most to be concerned about the danger of Pakistan's nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands.

Still, India has been careful to avoid condemning Musharraf's imposition of emergency rule, and has refrained from demanding the restoration of democracy. New Delhi is reluctant to denounce the man it has come to reluctantly regard as its best chance for peace with its neighbor, whether fleeting or long-lasting. Indeed, New Delhi's relations with Islamabad have lately been better than ever. A four-year peace process launched under Musharraf has reduced cross-border infiltration by militants onto the Indian side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir, and has also led to sizable gains in cross-border trade. For the first time, the two sides have appeared capable of resolving the dispute over Kashmir that has been central to their conflict since both emerged as independent states.

"We know Pakistan's battle against terrorism has implications for us in India," says political commentator Manoj Joshi. "The dialogue with Musharraf has been, perhaps, the most sustained and productive ever. So I think there is a feeling that we should do nothing to simply blow it away." More importantly, India's avoidance of demanding a return to democracy in Pakistan may be attributed to the long-standing belief that to do business with Pakistan, one has to deal with the army. "The army is the only political party worth its name in Pakistan," says Ashok Behuria, research fellow at the Delhi-based Institute for Defence and Security Analyses.

At the same time, however, to hedge its bets, India has been making quiet overtures to the pro-democracy opposition. When former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, after returning to Pakistan, escaped a deadly attack on her convoy in Karachi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the ruling Congress Party's leader, Sonia Gandhi, personally called Bhutto to express concern. Yet publicly, India's stance has been reticent. Maintaining a silence while Washington waves sticks and carrots at its wayward protégé serves India's purpose just as well. Last week's visit to Pakistan by Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte was followed with much interest in India. Some analysts saw his meeting with Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, tipped to be the next army chief, as preparation for what would follow after Musharraf steps down as Army Chief of Staff. "The most unfortunate scenario would be if, post-elections, the Pakistan army's support should get divided between Musharraf and Kiyani," says Behuria, "The army is what keeps Pakistan together and brings a measure of stability to an otherwise highly unstable political scenario. Hence, getting Kiyani on board is a good move."

Washington, while not pulling the plug on Musharraf — President Bush reiterated Tuesday that he has found Musharraf "to be a man of his word" — nonetheless insists that elections be held under the rule of law and not under emergency rule.

But the political equation is becoming increasingly complex. Musharraf is currently visiting Saudi Arabia, which has long-standing close ties with Islamabad — and is also the exile home of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf overthrew in 1999. While Benazir Bhutto has returned to demanding that Musharraf resign following the breakdown of the political marriage between them brokered by the U.S., Musharraf may be trying to bring Nawaz Sharif over to his side. A Musharraf pact with Sharif would be even stranger than his short-lived alliance with Bhutto. But regardless of the outcome of the political maneuvering, New Delhi will have to do business with whoever ends up at the helm in Islamabad. That means waiting and watching, and keeping channels of communication open to as many of the main players as possible.