Losing Streak

Early last week, Mullah Ustad Mohammed Atta seemed certain, murderously so, that Northern Alliance forces would take Mazar-i-Sharif, a strategically crucial city in northern Afghanistan that has been the site of numerous bloody incursions over the past decade. It didn't matter that the Taliban had more men and more weapons there; Atta insisted that its morale was low and dropping by the minute, and that it was only a matter of time before defectors began spilling out. The 37-year-old commander had already led a premature and decidedly ill-conceived raid on Oct. 16, during which roughly 200 of his men were captured and an undetermined number killed. But U.S. jets had since started bombing Taliban positions and munitions in and around Mazar-i-Sharif. And this time, Atta would be accompanied by the forces of General Rashid Dostum, the notorious and ruthless Uzbek warlord who was being advised by U.S. military strategists. From his hillside camp overlooking the barren plains between him and his target, Atta forecast nothing less than annihilation for the Taliban: "We'll kill them all."

When the push finally came, Atta's bravado was thoroughly exposed. On Monday evening, he and Dostum sent their men forward on foot and horseback, armed with AK-47s. Almost immediately they met resistance from the better-manned and better-armed Taliban. Depending on which account of the battle you believe, it was at best a defeat, at worst a rout. What is certain is that the reversal set the tone for a very bad week for the ragtag coalition of warlords ranged against the Taliban.

[an error occurred while processing this directive]Even as Atta and Dostum were taking a beating outside Mazar-i-Sharif, the Alliance was faring poorly in the initial rounds of a p.r. effort designed to shore up its place as a crucial element of the U.S.-led military strike against the Taliban and, as important, a power player in any post-Taliban government in Afghanistan. From the start of the campaign, the U.S. has kept the Alliance, still the recognized government of Afghanistan, at arm's length. Knowing they needed the rebels' experience fighting the Taliban on its own terrain, the Americans promised logistical and material support, and seemed willing to factor in the Alliance in efforts to cobble together a post-Taliban government. But the U.S. shied away from fully embracing the Alliance. For one thing, Pakistan, the central U.S. ally in the region, is deeply antagonistic toward the warlords, having previously backed the Taliban against them. For another, the Alliance's own record in governance is scarcely better than the Taliban's.

Between 1992 and 1996, several factions of what now makes up the Alliance controlled most of Afghanistan; they spent much of that time and most of the country's resources in internecine fighting. They turned Kabul's streets into a war zone, battling each other with tanks, artillery and air strikes that killed an estimated 10,000 civilians, drove hundreds of thousands from their homes and flattened wide swathes of the city. For Kabulis, the Taliban and the Alliance are both bad news. "Orderly oppression or chaotic violence: it's a tough choice," says Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan expert at New York University's Center for International Cooperation.

To fight that perception, the Alliance says it has repented for its past mistakes and reformed itself into a reliable, responsible organization. For instance, its Foreign Minister, Abdullah Abdullah, has been at pains to assure foreign journalists that women would be included in any Alliance-led cabinet. The group also points to its police academy in the Panjshir Valley as proof that it is determined to prevent a repeat of the lawlessness that characterized Kabul before the Taliban took control. "There is no question of any repetition of the events that took place in Kabul before," promises Mohammad Da'oud Askaria, the director of the academy. Northern Alliance representatives have also been cozying up to former King Mohammed Zahir Shah, who is favored by the U.S. to lead a broad-based post-Taliban administration.

But the public relations exercise is failing where it matters most: in Washington. Alliance spokesman Haron Amin moved there from New York following the Sept. 11 attacks, to lobby for assistance. But other than a meeting three weeks ago with the National Security Council's resident expert on Afghanistan, Zalmy Khalil Zad, he has had almost no access to decision makers in the Bush Administration. "At State we asked for (Deputy Secretary Richard) Armitage, but he was busy," Amin says. "I've asked for (Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning) Richard Haass, but he's been busy, too." He has met some members of Congress, but for the most part he has been lobbying through the press.

Amin's failure to get anywhere in Washington is felt by Alliance troops on the frontlines near Mazar-i-Sharif and north of Kabul: they are staggering, short of food and ammunition. The Taliban, meanwhile, seems to have no difficulty replenishing munitions destroyed in the American air raids. While Alliance leaders wait for promised U.S. assistance, they are bickering among themselves about what to do next and growing increasingly frustrated with mixed signals from Washington. Last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell said he hoped the Alliance would be able to capture Mazar-i-Sharif, but the support that might have increased the odds in favor of Dostum and Atta never materialized. Yusto Khalili, Northern Alliance commander and member of Afghanistan's war council, south of Dostum at Yakawland, said, "We do not know how long the war will continue. It all depends on American help and the world community. If they give us more help, then the war will finish sooner. Nobody is helping us—we have no food and no ammunition."

Still, it seems clear that the war planners in Washington cannot afford to ignore the Alliance; the assassination of anti-Taliban Pashtun leader Abdul Haq last week makes the Alliance warlords the only rebel commanders of any stature. Even if Dostum and Atta can't seize Mazar-i-Sharif, the U.S. will need their experience when it sends its own ground troops into Afghanistan. Last Friday, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem told reporters that the U.S. "will utilize all of our forces and all of the types of warfare that we have to bring to bear." He characterized the relationship between American and Northern Alliance forces as one of mutual support. But then he added: "We are not going to adapt our game plan to theirs, necessarily." Washington isn't buying the notion of a new, improved Northern Alliance, yet.