AN STYLE="font-size: 75%; color:#990000; font-weight:bold">Wednesday, November 14, 2001 Since the United States asked Gen. Pervez Musharraf for help in the War on
Terrorism, the dictator and his officials have wasted no opportunity to remind
Washington (and the world) that the last time Pakistan lent a hand it was
abandoned by the Americans as soon as their objective had been met. After
helping the U.S. fight a proxy war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
in the 1980s, Pakistan had hoped to remain Washington's special friend: instead,
it was treated like a pariah, with the added humiliation of seeing the Americans
chummy up with India. Musharraf has refered to that slight in almost all his
press conferences, and his officials have weighed in as well, using expressions
like "ditched" and "jilted."
The no-so-subtle objective of these repeated reminders is to prevent history
repeating itself. The Pakistanis hope that a suitably abashed America will be
more sensitive to their feelings this time round, and will remain friendly long
after the current campaign in Afghanistan has ended. Expect this chorus to rise
to a cresendo over the next few weeks as the Taliban is pushed into a corner.
But emotional blackmail is an unreliable diplomatic tool: Musharraf and his
officials would do well to look more closely into the reasons why Pakistan was
"ditched" before in order to prevent it from happening again. America didn't
dump a good friend, it simply ended a temporary arrangement. What it had with
Pakistan was not really a relationship, it was more like a one-night stand.
Like people, countries can only build long-term relationships when they share
common values. And secular, democratic America had little in common with the
Islamic dictatorship that helped win the first Afghan War. (When democracy did
come to Pakistan, it was deeply flawed, with the military still calling the
shots.) That is why the U.S. turned away.
It's like doing business with somebody you suspect is a slightly shady
character: you don't want to socialize with him when the deal is done.
This is not to say America (or any other nation, for that matter) doesn't forge
ties with shady characters -- countries that don't share its values. The U.S. has
at one time or another been in bed with tinpot dictators in Africa,
fundamentalist Islamic kingdoms in the Persian Gulf and the communist regime in
China. But all of these ties were and are based on specific objectives -- the Cold
War, oil or massive markets for American companies. Never mind what American
politicians say, Saudi Arabia and China are not America's "friends," they are
no more than partners of convenience.
America's real friends are countries like Britain and France and Canada, with
which it shares the values of secularism and liberal democracy. Like all
friends, they occasionally bicker -- about tarrif barriers, say, or environmental
protection -- but you know that the underlying friendship will endure.
This has nothing to do with race. For a test, ask an African-American cab driver
in New York, a Hispanic barman in LA or a white delivery boy in Boston whether
they think of China as a friendly country. I think you already know the answer.
Lacking rich oil reserves or a billion-man market, Pakistan cannot hope to hold
on to America's interest for very long after the campaign against the Taliban.
What must Islamabad do to be one of Washington's enduring friends? For a start,
it must quickly return to democracy -- and a real one this time, please, with the
military staying out of it. Sadly, Musharraf has made it plain he has no
intentions of giving up power. For all the assurances coming out of Washington,
Pakistan is doomed to be "ditched" again.