Joe Klein: What I Saw at the Revolution

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But "sensationalism" for "domestic use" is what political campaigns are usually all about. During more than a week in Iran, I interviewed as many people who admired Ahmadinejad as were appalled by him. On election day at the Hossein Ershad Mosque in north Tehran, I spoke with Ismail Askari, the head of the taxi drivers' union in the city of Malard, just west of Tehran. He was a Mousavi supporter, but he admitted, "Most of the people in my cab have been happy with the present government."

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And while it's the ultimate journalistic cliché to quote a cabdriver, I can't resist this one: on the Saturday before the election, I attended a large and metaphoric Mousavi rally — someone had cut the electricity, so the candidate couldn't speak — in the city of Kharaj, about an hour west of Tehran. The cabbie who drove us back to Tehran said his parents were divided on the election. "My mother supports Mousavi, and my father supports Ahmadinejad," he said. "I was uncertain until I saw them debate. Ahmadinejad seemed stronger. I don't think I would want Mousavi negotiating with other governments."

Which may be exactly what the Supreme Leader — who is the real power in Iran, with control over the military, the judiciary, foreign policy and the nuclear program — had in mind when, on June 13, he prematurely certified the phantasmic Ahmadinejad landslide. In the days before the election, reformers and principalists — including several Ahmadinejad advisers — told me that negotiations with the U.S. were likely, regardless of who won. "But it might be easier for the Supreme Leader to proceed if the tough guy is re-elected than if Mousavi is," said Mohebbian, the prominent principalist. "The negotiating team will be jointly decided by the Supreme Leader and the President. The Leader, who has great doubts about proceeding, will want a tough bargainer."

In truth, the reformers I spoke with seemed as unyielding as Ahmadinejad, if more politely so, when it came to discussing what Iran would be willing to concede in negotiations with the U.S. They were adamant on Iran's nuclear enrichment program, which is permitted for peaceful purposes under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. None of them, except Mousavi, was willing to acknowledge that weaponization of uranium might be in the works and therefore be a subject for negotiation. (Mousavi told me that if such a program existed, it would be negotiable, but he didn't say, and may not know, that it actually exists.) The reformers were unanimous in the belief that Barack Obama's conciliatory words were not enough, that the U.S. had to take palpable actions before talks would be possible. I asked each of them what steps Iran was prepared to make for peace. The answer was always the same. "It's natural that the first step should be taken by the Americans," said Karroubi, the most progressive of the four presidential candidates. "We didn't stage a coup against your elected government," he said, referring to the CIA's participation in the 1953 overthrow of the Mohammed Mossadegh government. "We have not frozen your assets. We don't have sanctions against you." (Of all the reformers, only Mousavi seemed to think that Obama's acknowledgment of the 1953 coup in his Cairo speech was a "positive step.")

Ahmadinejad's advisers were even more adamant than the reformers. When I asked Mehdi Kalhor, Ahmadinejad's top communications adviser, what he thought of Obama, he made a crude attempt at humor. "Only the skin color has changed" from George W. Bush, he said. "Now the color is chocolate. Chocolate is sweet. Children like it, but I don't very much." We met in Kalhor's office. He was wearing a red golf shirt, and his long hair was tied in a ponytail. "We understand Obama is different from Bush," he said, more seriously. "But you need these negotiations more than we do." I asked him why the U.S. did, since Iran was the country that was isolated from the rest of the world. "You're more isolated than we are," he replied, directly reflecting his boss's public arrogance. Ahmadinejad has offered to debate Obama at the U.N. but has been silent about substantive negotiations. When this point was raised by an AP reporter at his postelection press conference, Ahmadinejad was dismissive. "That's a suggestion," he said. "Not a question."

Such intransigence — and the tarnished election results — makes the question of negotiations harder for Obama, but also easier in some ways. The U.S. President was appropriately cautious after the elections — criticizing the use of violence against the protesters, but not the results of the vote. It seems clear that his Administration will continue to seek negotiations that will, among other things, attempt to increase the transparency of Iran's nuclear program. If the Iranians are smart, they will respond quickly. If they continue to dally, Iran's electoral embarrassment will make it easier for Obama to rally other countries behind a tougher sanctions-and-deterrence plan that will further isolate Iran. But that may be exactly what the current regime wants. "Look, for the past 30 years, the Supreme Leader — first Khomeini, now Khamenei — has blamed all our problems on the Great Satan," a prominent conservative told me. "If you take away the Great Satan and we still have problems, how does he explain it? Almost everyone here is in favor of ending this war with America. But no one has less incentive to make peace than the Supreme Leader."

On the day after the election, two crowds gathered in front of the Ministry of Interior — Mousavi and Ahmadinejad supporters, several hundred of each, separated by the police. They chanted their slogans back and forth, and I was reminded of the wonderful street debates I'd seen several nights earlier. But suddenly the police, on motorcycles and on foot, dressed like starship troopers in body armor and brandishing billy clubs, charged into the Mousavi crowd. People began to run; some were knocked down; bodies were flying. And the Ahmadinejad crowd began to cheer.

It is impossible for an outsider, in Iran for 10 days, to sift through the governmental opacity, the contradictory demonstrations, and predict what comes next. It seems likely that no matter how many people flood the streets in protest, the Supreme Leader will continue to back Ahmadinejad. It also seems likely that while Barack Obama should continue to press for negotiations, he shouldn't be too optimistic about the prospect of success.

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