Face-to-Face-to-Face in the Aegean

When I took over the State Department's Intelligence Bureau in 1985, I told my staff to send me all important stuff but no cables from any embassy on the subject of Cyprus negotiations. As fate would have it, I left that position years later to become U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

The quarter-century division of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has been the biggest thorn in a long, contentious Greek-Turkish relationship, but for the rest of the world it has become mostly a yawn. There has been little threat of war and, rightly or wrongly, 30,000 Turkish forces have remained on the island since the 1974 invasion to keep it that way.

Because of the interest in reducing tensions between two nato allies during the cold war and the influence of ethnic lobbies on U.S. politics, vast diplomatic efforts have been expended to produce an agreement to end the division. Diplomats have poured out incessant cables and e-mails on fruitless talks and minute subjects. Indeed, bowing to Congressional pressure, the U.S. once had three envoys traipsing over the divided island, more per capita than in any other state.

The yawn is no more; the end of the Cyprus issue, as the world has known it, may actually be approaching. This is due to the European Union's insistence on admitting in the next few years the Cyprus Republic, the Greek part of the island, if there is no settlement between the two Cypriot parties. The E.U.'s stance, however, has made the issue less about Cyprus and more about something of far greater importance: the future of Turkey in Europe.

The E.U. effectively told the Turks to reach a Cyprus settlement or their chances of getting into the E.U. would be zilch. Instead of caving, Turkey shot back a warning that if the E.U. carried out its threat to take in only Greek Cyprus, the Turks might incorporate the Turkish part into Turkey. That would both shatter Greek-Turkish relations and create a permanent bone of contention between Turkey and the E.U. In short, a game of chicken with consequences that no party wanted seemed to be under way.

The potential for long-term damage has caused all the parties to step back. There has been soothing rhetoric, but far more hopeful was the start of formal negotiations last week in Nicosia between the longtime leaders of the two communities on an agreement that would, in some fashion, end the island's division. These are the first face-to-face talks between Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash in four years. Cynics would say the talks are mostly for show and note that there are still basic issues to be resolved, like the nature of the Cyprus state. But there is an air of expectancy.

For Turkey far more is involved than the future of Cyprus. The Turkish élite, particularly in the business sector, doesn't want its country's E.U. entry imperiled by a rigid position on Cyprus. Many Turkish Cypriots feel the same way. The government in Ankara has clearly expressed its dedication to joining the union. But it is in something of a catch-22 situation. It knows that admission is unlikely without a Cyprus settlement. Yet the government could make concessions on Cyprus, suffering serious domestic political pain in the process, and still not get into the E.U.

Indeed many Turks feel that the Europeans will never admit them. Though Sept. 11 may have brought home to the West Turkey's strategic value, it also made many in the E.U. ask whether they want 65 million more Muslims in Europe. Brussels ostensibly moved the goalposts for Turkey by making a settlement on Cyprus an accession requirement, and not a few Turks believe the E.U. could well raise the bar on other issues, even if Turkey meets the general E.U. political and economic criteria. Turks are certainly aware that some senior European leaders are less favorable in private toward Turkish admission than they appear to be in public. Moreover, will Greece, already a member of the E.U. club, impose additional conditions for Turkish admission to resolve other Greek-Turkish differences, like oil and gas exploration rights on the continental shelf in the Aegean? The current Greek government has improved relations with its neighbor but has also been adamant on the admission, if necessary, of a divided island. Who is to say what another Greek government may do?

Certainly it will be a long time before Turkey will be able to meet the criteria for E.U. membership. Nevertheless, Ankara is taking serious steps to do so, and that will benefit the country whether it is allowed to join or not. Is Europe prepared to facilitate a solution to the Cyprus problem by providing — whatever the practical difficulties — much better assurances that Turkey can join the E.U. if it meets the current requirements and only the current requirements?