Witness for the Prosecution?

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This article was first published in the Belgrade weekly Vreme (www.vreme.com).

Tuesday, Feb. 12, 2002
Speculation is mounting in Serbia that the former Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic may be called to testify against Slobodan Milosevic. Recently the Yugoslav press published information that Lilic was "taking intensive English classes" and is "the protected witness [known as] K-3" who will be the first to testify against Milosevic in the Kosovo case. Out of all the media allegations, Lilic admits to only one: that he is once again being pursued by high officials of The Hague tribunal.

During the [NATO] air raids [on Yugoslavia] in 1999, Lilic conducted many secret missions while the bombs were falling. Lilic was one of the rare high officials who had enough courage to warn Milosevic of the historical responsibility he would have to bear should he make the wrong choices. Because of that he was chased out of [Milosevic's party] and spent more than a year at the unemployment office, after which he created the Serbian Social Democratic Party, of which he is president.

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In an interview with Lilic, the independent weekly Vreme starts with the interview with the often repeated statement that Lilic, once a close Milosevic aide, is recognized as one of the possible "insiders" at the upcoming trial.

Zoran Lilic: It is true I was a close assistant of Milosevic. Not only an assistant, I really believed in the politics in use in the 1990s. If I hadn't believed it, I wouldn't have participated in it. I was one of his most reliable and sincere assistants, even if that perhaps was not a clever move on my part. It is true that I know many things from that period that The Hague tribunal is interested in and that The Hague would like to have me present in court in any capacity. I still don't know what kind of presence this will be and I don't want to comment on it. I know for certain that there's no element that could put me on the list of indicted persons by command responsibility. Anyway, I hope that the life of The Hague tribunal will end soon, and that it will not judge Yugoslavia, Serbia, and the Serbian people, but rather certain individuals who committed crimes of one kind or another. It should not be doubted that the tribunal is a reality — it exists, it judges, it accuses, it sentences, and on top of all that, it is writing history with a pen that could write many incorrect, or I would say lethal, things for our people and state. [...]

I didn't secretly meet any ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] investigators and I have no intention of testifying against Milosevic. Not even for him. Anyway, he chose his own path in spite of what some of us told him, in spite of many attempts by me to direct things in a completely different way. He chose his way, but he shouldn't be allowed to lead this country down the same path. In 1993, I think Milosevic said that "you can sacrifice everything for the people except the people themselves." He needs to repeat that sentence to himself now, or maybe to his associates, who are trying to create an atmosphere where everyone who agrees to testify is immediately named as a traitor ... Everyone who mentions Milosevic's name is a traitor, too, or all the others who say that there were better solutions in the past. Such people will not influence me. [...]

Vreme: From the indictment against Milosevic it seems that everything that was done from Vukovar to Kosovo was inspired by the idea of creating a "Greater Serbia" with a clear criminal intent. In that period, you were the president of Yugoslavia for four years. Do you agree with such an approach by the prosecution and do you see room for your own responsibility?

Lilic: Of course I don't agree. We didn't have a breakup of the state; a breakup is usually negotiated and everything occurs peacefully. This case was about a violent seccession from the former Yugoslavia. I can't agree that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the Serbian people were the only participants in some awful crimes. There were individual actors who carried out those crimes, because there were extremists in every group. That's why I don't accept the argument that the "Greater Serbia" concept was created here. It was recently said in The Hague that the Greater Serbia concept called for "the whole of Kosovo annexed to Serbia. Kosovo was always part of Serbia; it was never part of Albania. [...]

Vreme: Five years ago you were an unsuccessful presidential candidate in Serbia. Milosevic didn't support you with much enthusiasm. In some way, you can be grateful to Milosevic that you did not become president then. You would easily be transferred on to the wanted list for The Hague, because you would have been president during the war in Kosovo.

Lilic: In the days before those elections, Milosevic and I talked often. At one point he said I might be thankful one day if I were not elected president of Serbia. I am really thankful I am not the president of Serbia now. If I look at my personal interests and those of my family, I have to be very grateful to him. If I look at some other things, it is not like that. Maybe it sounds immodest, maybe even daring, to say now that the situation in Kosovo would have been different [if I had been president]. Perhaps I would be on The Hague tribunal list for it, but I am sure that our police and military would still be in Kosovo, doing their duty under the law, and that there would be Serbs there. There are no Serbs in Kosovo. That fact is more important to me than my personal satisfaction and happiness that I am not in prison at The Hague. Maybe it would be much better if more of us were in that prison with a better situation in Kosovo.

Vreme: In November 1998, you wrote a detailed report to Milosevic in which you claimed [Serbs] had been surrounded, that [NATO] would probably bomb us, that it was necessary to improve control of the state border with Albania. He ignored all your proposals.

Lilic: It is correct that the process of my marginalization started in 1997. I wasn't invited to many important sessions. I personally wanted to be in charge of security in the Yugoslav government. My knowledge of army operations was good and I felt that I could help in that field. I visited Kosovo with the army delegation, and once Milosevic wanted me to go there and investigate some disturbing reports he had received from other services. He was informed that the situation was secure and under control, that the people were completely protected and that communications were free. None of it was true. That's why I made this report in November 1998. I was convinced we could avert everything that happened only few months later. That's why I said we had to stop lying to ourselves via state television and try to get media space outside to explain what was going on. Why did Milosevic ignore all of that? It may be that the part of his circle didn't want to see anything originating from me and that it was suggested that he ignore my report and rely only on information from state security. At that time, the terrorist rebellions still had not grown into the widespread rebellion of the entire [ethnic] Albanian people. At the end of 1998, the border with Albania could still be secured, which would prevent arms smuggling and terrorist infiltration.

Vreme: While Yugoslavia was being bombed you often traveled outside the country. You met delivered the secret peace plan of [former German Chancellor] Helmut Kohl, a better plan than the one accepted later.

Lilic: I was the man of special missions you don't know much about, but in that job I wasn't Milosevic's man. Of course, everything I did was with his knowledge and permission. Only later was it seen that he did not wish to support that. Even before the bombing I established contacts with some important people who were positioned in high places concerning world events and offered us their help. The only condition was that we wanted to help ourselves. I started traveling after the bombs had been falling for some time and people from JUL were talking loudly about NATO being almost destroyed and world globalization ending with its back broken. From time to time it seemed as if some people didn't care how many people would die here and how much of the country would be destroyed.

Vreme: What was the basis of the peace plan offered in the midst of war by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl?

Lilic: That meeting with Kohl on 3 May 1999 could have been historic for this country. We were asked to accept UN troops in Kosovo, and would have been able to choose. The Russians and Chinese could have been there, along with others from the UN permanent Security Council. Kohl suggested the French, because he knew we wouldn't like to see Americans and English. Kohl agreed to talk Clinton into it and claimed he could certainly succeed. Clinton was about to come to Berlin to the G8 summit, while Kohl himself was in the US before that. We were at the very brink of stopping the bombing. The plan provided for 12,000 of our soldiers and police in Kosovo, which had been agreed to under the [1998] Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement. Compare it to what we have now in Kosovo. Bonn gave us 48 hours to respond to the offer. On my way back to Belgrade I was convinced I was bringing something huge. I was bringing the possibility to end the bombings in a day or two.

Vreme: But after your meeting with Kohl the war lasted 37 more days and many people were killed. Why did Milosevic refuse Kohl's offer?

Lilic: I don't know. Everybody around the plan was interested greatly in its success. Kohl was facing elections for the European parliament, and in Germany there were many questions about the continuation of the war. [...]There was no reason not to try. Sometimes I think Milosevic gave it up because of his own suspicion. [...]

Vreme: Did Kohl's plan include the possibility of Milosevic avoiding extradition to The Hague?

Lilic: That was one of the subjects of my conversation with Kohl. There was an open threat to Milosevic; Belgrade received such a message every day. I told Kohl it was not logical to indict someone for war crimes that were not yet proven and to ask the same person to accept a peace plan. He understood that approach and told me to tell Milosevic that he would do everything he could to prevent all negative effects and remove that threat. Kohl was ready to guarantee something like that.