Training Day for Georgia's Army

Monday, Mar. 4, 2002
It's no big deal, U.S. officials say of their $64 million program to train as many as 1,600 Georgian soldiers in counter-insurgency over the next six months. Not everyone would agree. The decision lands Washington in the middle of the complex, violent world of Caucasus politics and allies it firmly with a leader — Georgia's Eduard Shevardnadze — whose popularity and grip on power have weakened dramatically in recent years and who remains high on Vladimir Putin's list of least favorite people.

The sudden announcement that between 100 and 200 U.S. Green Berets and other specialists will be landing in Georgia by the end of the month has infuriated Russia, which views Georgia as firmly within its sphere of interest. And it leaves open a number of questions, such as: Why would the dozen or so suspected al-Qaeda terrorists, whose presence in the remote Pankisi Gorge in northern Georgia triggered the training plan, hang around until a new force is trained? Might Washington have another agenda that extends far beyond the Pankisi Gorge?

The Pentagon is moving fast. The U.S. troops start arriving in mid- to late March, Georgian officials says. They will begin with "field training" in the summer, a senior Western defense official said. About a third of the troops will come from the Georgian army's 11th Brigade, which is tasked with the defense of the capital, Tbilisi. The program will also offer intelligence support and training, Georgian officials say, and help organize a light armored unit. The U.S. says the program will provide a modest amount of hardware, including communications gear, light weapons, ammunition and vehicles. But Giorgi Baramidze, chair of the Georgian parliament's defense and security committee, says that the U.S. has promised "all necessary equipment" for the counter-insurgency troops.

The Russian response to the news was also swift and a touch ominous. It followed a familiar pattern: Putin was mildly reproachful of Washington in his public statements, saying that the plan was "no tragedy" for Russia. His lieutenants put the knife in. A gas concern closely linked to the Kremlin announced it would suspend fuel supplies to Tbilisi. Dmitry Rogozin, chair of the International Affairs committee of the lower house of parliament, predicted that U.S. intervention would trigger the breakup of Georgia. "Any action not coordinated with Russia, the main guarantor of Georgian unity, can lead to a serious activization of separatist movements across Georgia," he said. One secessionist region, Abkhazia — which broke away from Tbilisi's control with Russian military assistance in 1992 — promptly announced that it would seek associate status with Russia.

Such rumblings worry Western observers, who note that Russia has a serious capacity for subversion in Georgia. Russians have been accused of participation in most of the many efforts to kill or depose Shevardnadze. Moscow denies this. The Kremlin is bitter at being forced to pull out of its large bases in the country and is furious at Georgia's open sympathy for Chechen rebels, many of whom find shelter in the Pankisi Gorge.

U.S. officials claim that the "modest" program will strengthen Russian security by eliminating international terrorists and criminal gangs operating near Russia's border. Officials also note that security training has many side benefits for U.S. policymakers. When the U.S. needed to set up advance bases before the Afghanistan operation, for example, their small programs in Central Asia — like counter-insurgency training in Kyrgyzstan — gave them a foot in the door. The Georgia program puts U.S. forces in a friendly nation just TK km northwest of a country that Washington takes very seriously — Iraq. No big deal?