Voices of the Intifada

What happened to the smiles and handshakes?

Yasser Arafat signaled a new era for Palestinians seven years ago when he signed the Oslo peace accords at the White House amid international acclaim. The moment was captured for the history books by the photograph of Arafat shaking hands with then–prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Palestinians seemed on the verge of achieving their hard-fought national independence.

Today, the sound of clapping has been drowned by the rat-a-tat-tat of gunfire across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian frustration with Oslo's results exploded into a new uprising last September, which in turn threw the future of peace negotiations in doubt. As hard-liner Ariel Sharon prepares to become Israel's new prime minister, warning that predecessor Ehud Barak's recent peace offer to Arafat is off the table, the prospects are likely for further stalemate and violence.

The Palestinians are the biggest losers, at least for now, in the renewed confrontation. They struggled hard for a state of their own, nearly getting what they wanted in the peace talks at Camp David last July. They will have to accept a further delay in achieving independence, and possibly pay with more blood before reaching their aims.

It is hard to understand why Palestinians returned to war until you spend some time experiencing their bitterness firsthand. They point to Israel's reluctance to agree to true independence, the continuing construction of Jewish settlements and the Clinton administration's handling of the peace process. TIME Cairo bureau chief Scott MacLeod traveled across the West Bank and Gaza Strip to hear from Palestinians themselves how they went from Oslo to intifada. Here is what some of the key players told him:

"I warned Arafat about Oslo"

Haider Abdel Shafi, veteran Palestinian activist, who led the delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference but later criticized Arafat's acceptance of the Oslo accords:
When we decided to go to Madrid, we were not really under any illusion about the position of Israel. We only hoped that the if the U.S. waged a war in the Gulf to end an occupation that hardly was there for four or five months [Iraq's occupation of Kuwait], then, by all measures of justice, they should end an occupation that had been in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for some 25 years. But our hope was frustrated very quickly on the negotiating table as Israel refused to stop the settlement activity on the ground. And when we appealed to the American sponsor of the peace process, they were unable or did not want to press Israel to stop its settlement activity. I was advising our leadership that we should suspend our participation.

I warned Chairman Arafat about Oslo before it was signed. I condemned it in the press. Arafat insisted that I attend the signing ceremony at the White House, but I refused. I think Arafat is to blame very much for accepting the Oslo agreement. It did not address the settlement activity of Israel. Since they started implementing Oslo, Israel still continued its settlement activity. The Palestinian side did not say anything. They did not object. I know this very well, because I was pressing Arafat, "How can you accept this? By sitting at the table, you are providing Israel with a cover for its settlement activity." Certainly it is a big mistake. Democracy is needed. Arafat will never admit that he made a mistake. He will simply blame Israeli aggression. Arafat is a symbol, the leader of a liberation movement. He enjoyed the support of the masses. But now people are saying, "We were better off under occupation."

My conclusion is that Arafat simply wanted to set foot on Palestinian soil. Possibly he was overconfident about his ability to proceed from there, to realize the Palestinian objective. He trusted his abilities as a leader, as a negotiator, to prevail over the Israelis. Palestinians are emotional. They looked at Arafat when he first came back as the symbol of patriotism. They had to accept what he said. Arafat is the man who supported Oslo, then they supported Oslo. I hope that people now became wiser. Now they know that they were mistaken and that the whole process was not in the interest of the Palestinian people.

If Arafat wants to suppress the intifada, certainly it is not going to be an easy task. The people became very convinced that the negotiating process is hopeless. As long as the Palestinians are unable to realize some sort of meaningful organization, some sort of real democratic change, I think the future is bad and we are on for a long period of suffering.

"They cannot live forever isolated"

Ahmed Qorei, also known as Abu Alaa, who led the secret negotiations with Israel on behalf of Yasser Arafat that led to the Oslo accords:
You know that in 1988 for the first time we recognized explicitly U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. It was the biggest concession in our life when we accepted just 22 percent of the size of historical Palestine. We had been claiming since the beginning of the century: "Palestine for the Palestinians, Muslims, Jews and Arabs." But in 1988, it was the wisdom of President Arafat, who convinced the Palestine National Council that this is the only way for peace. And therefore, the Palestinians have already made the biggest concession.

What is after that is for the Palestinians to negotiate when we have our state, what's the relationship between the Palestinians and the Israelis, what kind of stability will be guaranteed, what kind of security and how it will be guaranteed, how Israel will recognized from the Palestinians, details of economic relations, etc.

I believe the most important outcome of the Oslo negotiations is the mutual recognition between Israelis and Palestinians which was signed between Arafat and Rabin. After that, Oslo was built on the concept of gradualness, of building trust. There was to be the gradual [Israeli] withdrawal of from land leading in a very explicit way to the implementation of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. Unfortunately, the Israelis put aside all the scheduled times [for withdrawals]. During all this period, the most dangerous obstacle we faced was the expansion in building settlements, which is in our point of view the most dangerous violation of the peace. Unfortunately, we are back to square one. There is no trust at the moment.

I feel bad and frustrated. When we talked about the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338, we never thought that they [would] want the land. At the time, we were convinced that they would implement [the Oslo agreement]. They need peace. They cannot live forever in this region isolated.

I still believe that peace remains and will remain Arafat's choice. He has convinced the Palestinians about it. I have no doubt about that. He is a man who believes in reality. There are realities that have been created. He wants to lead his people for peace. No doubt he has been disappointed by Oslo. From my personal experience, the Israelis want peace. They know the national rights of the Palestinians. Unfortunately, the leadership understands the culture of power. This of course can lead to bad calculations. The leaders think the Palestinians are weak, so let's take from them, let's use pressure and power.

"We felt humiliated"

Yasser Abd Rabbo, Palestinian negotiator at the Camp David peace talks mediated by President Clinton:
Contrary to the story that was arranged by the State Department about Camp David, after three or four days the Israeli tactic was obvious. They will let the Americans negotiate with us and pressure us, but not the Israelis directly. This made us and especially Arafat furious from the beginning. Barak disappeared in Camp David. He did not meet with us. He sent his people to talk nonsense about various things and he left the serious work to be done by the Americans. Well, what was weird was that the Americans came with a draft agreement and it was a real shock to us. It was clear in the draft that it represents mainly the Israeli positions concerning various issues like Jerusalem and the refugees. We felt at that moment that these guys, the Americans and the Israelis, look at us as stupid creatures, people who could be deceived by just these elementary tactics of negotiation. We felt not only furious but humiliated.

1. Is It Time to Invade Burma?
2. Obama: How He Learned to Win
3. McCain's 7 Steps to Beating Obama
4. The Five Mistakes Clinton Made
5. Klein on Obama
6. 'Jesus' vs. Ahmadinejad
7. Obama Takes Superdelegate Lead
8. In Burma, Fear Trumps Grief
9. The Thriving Cult of Greed and Power
10. Al-Sadr Wins Another Round